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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Town Planning System has never been above criticism. One of the 
most interesting aspects of it is that it is a quasi legal system operating 
in a most practical and sometimes political environment which is 
constantly changing. Its mechanisms have developed in New Zealand 
over a comparatively short period of time. The adequacy of those 
mechanisms have been questioned as they have periodically struck 
difficulties. 
In this paper an effort is made to examine some of those mechanisms. 
This has been done in relation to recent problems that have been 
encountered and in the general context of a long standing dilemma. 
That dilemma is whether greater certainty or greater flexibility should 
be introduced to the town planning system. 
This paper is not designed to attempt to resolve the difficulties but 
merely consider the mechanisms, see how they function, how practical 
they are and assess to some degree the significance of the difficulties. 
2 SURVEY AND RESEARCH MATERIAL 
A questionnaire was prepared and sent out in mid Aug-ust 1985 to 71 Local 
Authorities. These Local Authorities were of varying sizes scattered 
throughout the length of New Zealand. The response to that 
questionnaire has been most encouraging in that the time of writing a 
reply had been received from approximately 80% of the recipients. The 
contents of the information contained in those replies permeates this 
, ,.., , ' . .. :-,. ..... , , . . . 
\ ,. ~ .,.-_ . -
JI, ..,,. ' _. .. 
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paper. Several large cities at the date of writing had not replied. It 
is understood that they were unable at the time to accumulate some of 
the information in the period given and hence when assessing the 
information some regard should be had for this fact. 
Earlier in the year a telephone survey was carried out covering the 
Local Authorities surrounding Wellington. In addition discussions have 
been held with two Planning Judges, a Senior Town Planner, a leading 
local Town Planning Practitioner and several local Town Planning 
Officers. The information contained from those discussions and 
interviews is included in this paper. At the outset the writer wishes to 
acknowledge the contributions made by the parties mentioned above and 
express gratitude for the same. 
3 SPECIFIED DEPARTURES 
3 .1 General 
District Schemes cater for a wide range of uses. It is clearly 
impossible to envisage all possible suitable uses and provide for 
them in an operative District Scheme. Even if it were possible 
to do this such a document would be far too lengthy and complex 
to the point where it would defeat its intended purpose which in 
my view is to provide some degree of certainty in the majority of 
cases as regards permissible land use. To make provision for 
flexibility in 1966 Local Authorities were empowered to authorise 
conditional uses within zones which were uses permitted subject 
to the Local Authorities consenting on an individual basis. Later 
- 3 -
in 1971 dispensations and waivers were also introduced. 
Contemporaneously with the introduction of conditional uses in 
1966 provision was made for the granting of consents for 
specified departures. A specified departure is defined in 
Section 2 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 as "an 
exception to any provision of the scheme granted under Section 
7 4 of this Act". This therefore allows for flexibility in respect 
of exceptional or unforeseeable developments. A consent to an 
application for a specified departure does not rezone the land or 
alter the provisions of the District Scheme but allows for the 
land to be used in a non-permitted way. This permission 
subsists whilst the use continues unabated in the same or a 
similar form continuously or at least without the elapsing for a 
period of more than six months without the consent of the Local 
Authority . 1 Section 74 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1977 makes provision for applications for the grant of a specified 
departure. Section 7 4 reads: -
"7 4. Specified departure from District Scheme -
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 62 
of this Act, an application may be made for 
the grant by the Council of an exception to 
any provision of an operative District 
Scheme by consenting to a specified 
departure. Every such application shall be 
by way of a notified application. 
1. Section 90(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. 
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( 2) Subject to section 3 of this Act, the Council 
may consent to such a specified departure 
only if:-
( a) The effect of the departure will not 
be contrary to the public interest 
and will have little town and country 
planning significance beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the land 
concerned, and the provisions of the 
scheme can remain without change or 
variation; or 
(b) The departure is in accord with the 
effect of a resolution which the 
Council has passed initiating a 
change or variation in the scheme, 
but which is of such urgency as to 
warrant its immediate authorisation in 
the public interest without waiting the time 
involved in completing the change or 
variation. 
(3) Repealed bys. 16, 1980 No. 167. 
( 4) In considering an application under this 
section to create an allotment that does not 
comply with the provisions of the District 
Scheme, the Council shall, if it is relevant 
in the circumstances of the case, and if the 
- 5 -
applicant was the owner of the land when the District Scheme or 
the relevant part or provision of it became operative, take into 
account the fact that the subdivision of any land in respect of 
which the application was made has been previously approved or 
did not require the approval of the Council at the time it was 
subdivided." 
3 . 2 Who can apply? 
Under the 1953 Act only the owner or occupier of the land 
concerned could apply for a specified departure. Now this 
restriction has been lifted and any person can apply whether 
2 they have an interest in the property or not. If the applicant 
was not the owner or the occupier, the owner or the occupier 
would be required to be served with a copy of the application as 
they would be persons with a greater interest in the application 
than the general public. 3 
3. 3 The Application 
2. 
3. 
The application submitted is stated to be for planning consent as 
required by Form A set out in the Schedule to the Town and 
Country Planning Regulations 1978. It is for the Local Authority 
to interpret the basis of the application and treat it accordingly. 
The application must state fully what is proposed so as to fully 
and fairly inform both the Local Authority and prospective 
Benfield v Wellington City Council (1979) 2 N. Z. L. R. 385. 
Regulation 37(3) of Town and Country Planning Regulations 
1978. 
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objectors. It is not necessary for the application to set out 
details of the ways in which the proposal fails to comply with the 
relevant District Scheme requirements. The application does not 
follow the prescribed form it is not necessarily invalid. 4 Where 
there is some doubt as to whether planning consent for a 
proposed or altered use is needed but the applicant wishes to 
avoid being faced with any application for an interim injunction 
it is not uncommon for the applicant to submit the application on 
a without prejudice basis subject to any existing rights, 
planning approvals or compliance with the operative District 
Scheme. 
It is up to the Local Authority to determine whether or not it 
requires further detailed information to fully comprehend an 
application for a planning consent. It makes sense that for a 
departure to be specified it is not possible to give blanket 
approval for a non-conforming use. Too often one suspects 
applications are filed stating proposals of a general nature 
accompanied by drawings and sketches suitably vague showing a 
considerable number of instant trees and foliage masking the 
true impact of the proposal. It is not essential to provide plans 
if a precise written definition of the proposal is given in the 
application as regards the proposed uses. It is possible to 
circumvent the needs of plans by giving exact details as regards 
the uses, bulk and location restrictions but if plans are later 
drawn for permit purposes the earlier detail submitted with the 
5 application consent must be incorporated within the plans. 
4. Fletcher Development Limited v Wellington City D No. W7 /81C2298 
5. Reapplication by Regional Centres (Mt Albert) Limited (1964) 2 
N.Z.1'.C.P.A. 181. 
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3. 4 Matters of National Importance 
The starting point for any Local Authority when considering an 
application for planning consent which it considers requires 
treatment as a specified departure application is to examine 
Section 3 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and 
consider whether the proposal is affected by matters in Section 3 
of the Act to be of national importance. The matters stated in 
Section 3 of the Act to be of national importance are: -
" ( a) The conservation, protection, and enhancement of 
the physical, cultural, and social environment: 
(b) The wise use and management of New Zealand's 
resources: 
(c) The preservation of the natural character of the 
coastal environment and the margins of lakes and 
rivers and the protection of them from unnecessary 
subdivision and development: 
( d) The avoidance of encroachment of urban 
development on, and the protection of, land having 
a high actual or potential value for the production 
of food: 
(e) The prevention of sporadic subdivision and urban 
development in rural areas: 
- 8 -
(f) The avoidance of unnecessary expansion of urban 
areas into rural areas in or adjoining cities: 
( g) The relationship of the Maori people and their 
culture and traditions with their ancestral land." 
The listed matters of national importance seldom arise in domestic 
applications for specified departures especially involving a 
suburban or city site. They more commonly arise in applications 
relating to rural areas or where environmental considerations are 
involved. Section 3 of the Act states that in implementing or 
administering a District Scheme the listed matters of national 
importance shall be recognised and provided for. There is 
therefore no absolute duty on the Local Authority to feel 
compelled to disallow an application which may be contrary to a 
matter of national importance or conversely consent to an 
application which may be in accordance with one or more of the 
listed matters of national importance. 
6 
3 . 5 Criteria to be satisfied 
The most commonly required criteria to be satisfied before a 
specified departure is granted are the threefold provisions of 
Section 74(2)(a). 
The criteria to be satisfied are conjunctive. The onus of proof 
is on the applicant not only to satisfy the Local Authority that 
6. Lion Breweries v Waimea County (1979) D.B. 2087 
Hyslop Properties v Wa1mar1 County D. No. C. 18/80 C. 337 
7. 
8. 
9. 
- 9 -
the provisions of Section 7 4 ( 2) have been fulfilled but also that 
the departure will not be contrary to the public interest. 7 If 
the applicant believes he can demonstrate the the departure 
sought in the application is warranted in the public interest but 
fails to satisfy either of the two limbs of Section 74(2) the 
applicant can appeal to the Planning Tribunal under Section 
69 ( 2). This involves a special set of circumstances that justify 
separate consideration. Similarly where the application comes 
before the Tribunal in the ordinary course and the applicant 
believes that it can satisfy one of the two limbs of Section 74(2) 
it is still open to the applicant as a residuary ground to seek to 
have the Tribunal exercise its discretion under Section 69(2) if 
it finds against the applicant on the first matter. Section 69 ( 2) 
will be discussed in more detail later. 
In considering an application for a specified departure the Local 
Authorities and the Tribunal (except where exercising its 
discretion under Section 69(2)) cannot consent to the application 
unless it can find there are circumstances peculiar to the 
1. t· 8 app 1ca 10n. The specified departure procedure is very suitable 
for dealing with circumstances that are true exceptions. It is a 
useful procedure for allowing the use where no or inadequate 
provision has been made for that type of use in the District 
9 
Scheme. This may be due to a new need arising or an 
increased need for land to be used for a certain type of 
activity. In addition to providing for such things as private art 
~eit v Wellington City (1978) D.B. 1014 
ow Mushrooms Ltd v Papakura County Council (1977) 6 
N.Z.T.P.A. 327 
Auckland Gliding Club Inc. v Franklyn County (1974) 4 
N.Z.T.P.A. 355 
Z.M. Patrick v Auckland City Council (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 26 
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galleries in residential zones and glider fields where this was 
unexpected other applications have been granted for such things 
as a blacksmiths workshop where there was no suitably zoned 
land lO and an LPG outlet for similar reasons on a site zoned for 
a petrol station. 
11 
In Morris and Another v Hawkes Bay County 
Council (1977) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 219 there was no appropriately 
zoned land to enable Maoris to live close to their marae. The 
grant of the departure was held to be justified in the public 
interest and it was said if the Council was likely to be 
embarrassed in refusing future similar applications it should take 
the step of providing suitable zoned land. One suspects some 
recognition in this case was also given to s. 3 (1 ){ g) of the Act. 
A finding that the circumstances relating to an application 
constitute a true exception leads to finding the application is not 
contrary to the public interest. 
Where it is held that exceptional circumstances exist the view is 
taken that the integrity of the scheme is not threatened. The 
Tribunal over recent years has consented to a number of 
applications on the basis that the proposed use is a one off use 
which the scheme couldn't necessarily be expected to make 
provision for. A review of a selection of such decisions gives 
one an insight into the Tribunal or Boards thinking on such 
matters. In 1971 the Board recognised this principle in Z. M. 
Patrick v Auckland City Council (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 26. The 
10. Canterbury Regional Planning Authority v Christchurch City 
(1977) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 262 
11. Terry v Thames/Coromandel District No. A151/80 C1750 
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applicants sought to establish a private art gallery in their 
residential property situated in Remuera Road, Auckland. The 
zoning did not permit such a use but the Tribunal held that the 
establishment of a private art gallery with a personal setting in 
a residential atmosphere would serve the public better than by 
forcing it to be placed in commercial premises in a commercial 
zone. In making the decision the Board recorded "that it is a 
proper use of the powers conferred by Section 35 11 (predecessor 
of Section 74) "to consent in appropriate cases to uses of a 
specialised or unusal kind the needs of which cannot be provided 
for in advance by general provisions in a District Scheme". In 
1982 the Tribunal considered an application to establish a clay 
shooting range in an area zoned Rural A in the case of 
Whangarei Combined Gun Club (Inc) v Whangarei County Council 
(1982) 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 476. Nearby rural residents objected. 
The basic ground of objection related to the noise level 
anticipated. It was held that the noise level restrictions could 
control any detrimental effects and the proposal was of a one-off 
kind for which the scheme couldn't be expected to make 
provision and it would not seriously detract from the amenities of 
the neighbourhood. Accordingly the Tribunal held that the 
integrity of the scheme was not threatened. In 1984 in the 
decision of Metge v Kapiti Borough Council 11 December 1984 
W122 / 84 the Tribunal considered an application for a 
comprehensive health and fitness centre to be established in an 
industrial zone. The Tribunal noted that there was not 
provision for such centres in the District Scheme and described 
- 12 -
the application as "a true departure and one that met the tests 
of section 7 4 ( 2) (a)". In this case there were some anomalies 
about this particular piece of industrial land and there was 
plenty of other spare industrially zoned land which could be 
used for normal industrial purposes and hence it was appropriate 
to grant consent. A fourth decision of Eyes v Whangarei City 
Council (1984) 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 217 is a little surprising. The 
appellants sought consent to serve between 10 a.m. and 3.30 
p. m. "Devonshire Teas" in the garden of an attractive old house 
established in a residential area five days a week. The use was 
not a permitted use and the Tribunal held itself persuaded that 
the true nature of a place serving Devonshire Teas is not in a 
commercial location as suggested by the Local Authorities. It 
held that if the such a use is to be established, it must be 
found in a residential or rural setting. As in this particular 
instance such a use was not provided for in those parts of the 
City the Tribunal granted its consent holding that the reason no 
doubt why no such provision had been made was because it was 
a relatively uncommon use which would not have been in mind 
when the scheme was prepared. 
Some of the above decisions are quite understandable but others 
do lead one to the conclusion that if one is seeking to establish 
a use which is even slightly unusual one has a better prospect 
of succeeding in establishing the use out of zone if the scheme 
is deficient in that it has not made provision for such a use. 
For this reason one may feel somewhat sorry for the appellant in 
3.6 
12. 
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the case of Kerr v Christchurch City Council Appeal 914/83. In 
that case the appellant sought to establish on the edge of a 
residential area "a factory" employing three workers to construct 
cycle touring equipment. The Tribunal held that such a 
business was not a "home occupation" and therefore not an 
enterprise of a one-off kind. In this respect one is left to 
question whether in 1984 a health and fitness centre or an outlet 
for Devonshire Teas are any more of a one-off or unusual type 
of use than a small type of cottage industry to construct cycle 
touring equipment situated on the edge of a residential area. 
Not contrary to the public interest 
Formerly the onus was on the applicant to prove that the 
proposal was positively in the public interest. Now it is only 
necessary for the applicant to prove that the proposal is not 
contrary to the public interest. Public interest is defined in 
Section 2 of the Act as "including all matters which in the 
circumstances of the case can be of public interest". It has 
been held that it goes beyond purely town planning 
considerations but any proposal which calls into question a 
general provision of a District Scheme is likely to be contrary to 
the public interest. 
12 
What precisely is in the public interest or 
rather not contrary to the public interest may vary according to 
the particular circumstances or alter with changing patterns of 
lifestyle and values. It was said by no lesser person than Mr 
Justice Casey in Raceway Motels Limited v Canterbury Regional 
Planning Authority (1976) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 40 "But any question of 
Highway Motors v Mt Wellington Borough (1972) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 
220 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
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public interest must depend upon any examination of the whole 
of the surrounding circumstances and can fluctuate with them 
and its assessment is obviously a matter of fact for the Council 
or Board". 
The public interest cannot clearly be a static standard as it must 
change with society. It is for Local Authorities and the 
Tribunal to move with the times. If the proposal will enhance 
the district or locality it has been suggested that it is not likely 
to be contrary to the public interest. 13 An example cited in 
support of this statement is the decision where the use of part 
of a rural property for a nudist camp has been found to be 
14 
acceptable. If one accepts that the primary nature of public 
interest is the "integrity" of the District Scheme 15 and that its 
general provisions and objectives should be followed then it is I 
suggest wrong to purely evaluate the public interest from the 
stand point at any one time on the basis that if the proposal 
enhances the district or locality then it is likely to be in the 
public interest. 
It is the above type of approach that negates the element of 
certainty that a District Scheme is designed to provide. That 
type of approach would encourage ad hoe decisions which have 
b h ld d . bl. f"d . 1 . 16 P 1 een e to un ermine pu 1c con 1 cnce 1n p ann1ng. eop e 
K.A. Palmer "Planning Law in New Zealand" 
Tainui Investments Limited v Waimea County Council (1980) 
N.Z.T.P.A. 65 
Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v Takapuna City (HC) 
Wgtn M596/83 
Sweetapple v Wellington City D. No. 42/83 
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are entitled to rely for the most part on the pattern of 
development laid down in the District Scheme. The difficulties 
arise when schemes are not reviewed regularly despite the 
statutory provision that they shall be reviewed once they have 
been operative for five years. 
17 
Even the District Schemes that 
are reviewed regularly take time to be completed e.g. the 
Wellington District Scheme Review which has just been completed 
was commenced in 1979. Hence, the provisions of the District 
Scheme become outdated in some respects. The real problem 
arises when a proposal may enhance the district or locality but 
is not in accordance with the provisions of the District Scheme 
due to the fact that the District Scheme in respect of that 
particular aspect may be outmoded or outdated. If it cannot be 
said that there is anything particularly unique or exceptional 
about the proposal then the question arises as to whether 
consent should be given to the application. It is my view that 
in such circumstances the ends cannot be allowed to justify the 
means. The correct procedure to be adopted is to effect a 
scheme change by way of a variation. The Planning Tribunal 
have certainly been fairly consistent in its view that specified 
departures should not be used to remedy zoning deficiencies 
except in the special circumstances provided for in Section 
18 74(2)(b) of the Act. It is the writer's experience however, 
that Local Authorities are far more willing to grant a specified 
departure in such cases to bring "justice" to a particular 
situation. This is unfortunately at best "ad hoe justice". Whilst 
this approach may be justified in viewing the circumstances in a 
17. Section 59 of the Act as amended 1983 No. 149 
18. May v Newmarket Borough (1970) 3 N.Z.T.P.A. 230 
19. 
20. 
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vacuum this is not the case I submit when the circumstances are 
viewed in a wider context because such decisions will slowly 
erode the reliability of the District Scheme. I suggest the 
advantages of dealing effectively with the given situation to the 
detriment of others is short-sighted. It is an approach that one 
can readily understand Local Authorities taking especially the 
larger ones where the composition of the Town Planning 
Committees change regularly to the extent that there tends to be 
a lack of consistency and overview. This issue highlights the 
continuing conflict between the benefits of flexibility as opposed 
to the benefits of certainty. It is this equation that must be 
regularly balanced. 
The public interest being considered in respect of any one 
application is the public interest of those people to whom the 
particular District Scheme is applicable. 19 For the benefit that 
may be derived from consent being given to any particular 
proposal on the basis that it is in the public interest such 
benefit must assist the community at large and not just private 
. t t 20 in eres s. One of the points raised in favour of the proposal 
for which consent was being sought in the case of Sweetapple v 
Wellington City was that the prospect of a retail timber supply 
outlet would be most desirable for the local residents who had no 
similar facility nearby. The Tribunal took the opportunity of 
repeating the often cited contrary view that it is not simply 
sufficient for the applicant to show that the proposal is for the 
Waimea Borough v Waikatane Borough (supra) 
Hill v Wellmgton City (19'11) 4 N.Z.1'.P.A. 29 
21. 
22. 
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public convenience for it to be considered in the public interest 
or rather not contrary to it. The Tribunal made similar 
comments in Gisborne Gas Company v Gisborne City (1983) 9 
N.Z.T.P.C.A. 124 in assessing the appellant's only argument in 
relation to the siting of an LPG filling station that "the proposed 
site is more convenient for motorists than the areas chosen by 
the respondent Council" not surprisingly the appeal was 
disallowed. 
Often when a specified departure is sought to introduce a 
commercial activity all the applicant's possible competitors who 
are ensconced in the District object to the proposal. The 
Tribunal has been quite prepared to examine the possible effects 
on existing local commercial interests to ascertain whether such 
1 . . th bl. . 21 proposa 1s 1n e pu 1c interest. Even where the applicant 
seeks to break a monopoly or strengthen competition which will 
one hopes lead to a better deal for the consumer the Tribunal 
has held that such matters do not justify the establishment of a 
commercial venture outside a suitably zoned area. 
22 
There have been two recent decisions in relation to the above 
aspect which at first sight appear difficult to reconcile. The 
first was Foodstuffs Christchurch Limited v Waimari County 
Council Division No. 3 10 June 1983 A. 670/82. Consent was 
given to a supermarket to construct an "out of zone" extention 
to its shop which was situated in the "Parklands Centre". A 
rival supermarket and others appealed. The Tribunal held that 
Sweetapple v Wellin~on City (supra) 
Roberts v Matamata aunty D No. A 131/80 
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there were exceptional circumstances in this instance and noted 
in particular the continued liability of "Parklands" and the 
supermarket company's inability to secure the implementation of a 
comprehensive development plan before 1989. This can be 
contrasted with the decision in Concept Projects Limited v 
Auckland City Council Division No. 4 15 June 1982 A. 730/82. 
Part of a road had a special residential zoning permitting medical 
and dental clinics and offices. The appellants purchased a site 
in this zone and constructed a building suitable for a medical or 
dental surgery. Unable to dispose of it the appellants sought 
consent to use it for ordinary professional offices. The Tribunal 
refused the application holding "a specified departure should not 
be used to protect those who undertake business ventures 
against the risk that the venture will not be financially 
successful". Presumably in the latter decision the Tribunal was 
saying to the appellants that the building must be saleable as a 
medical or dental clinic and offices "at a price" and the 
appellants must accept the lowering of the price to that level as 
part of the business risk. If the buildings were not saleable as 
a medical or dental surgery at any price because e.g. they were 
near an area where the drugs used would be affected, then the 
answer may well have been different as the decision could hardly 
have been in accordance with wise use of resources and 
therefore it may have been in the national interest to grant consent. 
The distinction between the two cases seems to be that in the former 
others would suffer as well as the applicant seeking consent whereas in 
the latter case it was only the appellants who would suffer. It is 
somewhat ironic that one can get planning permission for a specified 
departure "on the coat-tail of others". 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
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The availability of other possible sites especially those 
appropriately zoned for the intended use is always a 
consideration taken into account if such sites exist. A 
conclusion that the subject site is not suitable would be justified 
if another site is shown to be demonstrably superior, and not 
merely marginally better. 
23 The public interest may require 
individual private interests to be considered 
24 and that the 
avoidance of injustice may be a matter of public interest. 
25 If 
however an adjoining owner is likely to be prejudiced by a 
consent to a departure this will be contrary to the public 
interest except in the most exceptional circumstances. 
26 One 
such case however where the alleviation of injustice or hardship 
was found to outweigh the disadvantaged neighbour was Schultz 
v Paparua County Council (1978) 6 N. Z. T. P.A. 532. An 
addition to the first floor rooms of a house were found to 
infringe the height ordinance. The applicant had genuinely 
believed he could obtain the neighbour's consent. He didn't and 
the neighbour objected to his specified departure application on 
the grounds of loss of sunlight and privacy. The Tribunal 
especially recognised the former but following Smeaton' s case 
(supra) held that this was the a case where it was in the public 
interest to alleviate the hardship of the applicant. It wouldn't 
grant the consent under section 7 4 as it held it could have Town 
and Country Planning significance beyond the immediate vicinity 
In re an application by NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation (1981) 8 
N. Z. T. P.A. 138 
Blencraft Manufacturing Co Ltd v Fletcher Development Co Ltd 5 
N.Z.T.P.A. 33 
Smeaton v Queenstown Borough Council 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 410 
Findlay v Wellington City Council 6 N. Z. T. P.A. 76 
3.7 
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of the site but exercised its jurisdiction under Section 69(2). 
Personal hardship as a relevant factor was also recognised in the 
recent case of Smith v Clifton County Council (1983) 9 
N. Z. T. P.A. 134. The appellant purchased a residentially zoned 
section and sought permission to move onto it a house he had 
purchased from the New Zealand Synthetic Fuels Corporation 
Limited. He had left Motonui after living opposite the site of the 
Synthetic Fuels Plant when planning permission was granted 
despite his objection. He wished to live in the house but utilise 
part of it as a base for drying, storing and selling opossum 
skins. The Tribunal held that the personal hardship was not 
persuasive enough to enable the Tribunal to find that such 
activities were not contrary to the public interest since any 
hardship was due to the appellant's refusal to separate his 
proposed work from his home (there were other suitable sites 
with sheds further away). 
Little Town and Country Planning Significance 
How does one judge whether the effect of the departure will 
have little Town and Country Planning significance beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the land concerned? A decision most often 
cited in respect of this issue is Highway Motors Limited v Mount 
Wellington Borough ( supra) where the Board said 
"The "significance" spoken of is Town Planning importance 
or consequence. It can and should be measured in two 
ways:-
27. 
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(a) In the actual effect of the proposal on land uses 
(actual or prospective) in the immediate vicinity 
and beyond. 
(b) In its consequences in relation to the general 
provision of the District Scheme and the patterns 
of development laid down thereby." 
What constitutes "the immediate vicinity" will naturally depend on 
the scope and nature of the proposal and similarly the size and 
nature of the zone. It is suggested that a greater protection is 
likely to be given to predominant uses in residential areas where 
the standards of amenity are higher than in industrial areas. 
27 
The case law isn't entirely consistent with this statement in its 
simplest form. The likely effect of the proposal in terms of any 
detriment to the physical environment is also a significant part 
of the equation. Consent was given for the manufacture of soap 
on an industrial site where such an activity was a non permitted 
use and the site was surrounded by residential homes. This at 
first sight would seem horrendous but quite properly the 
proposal was considered in light of the effect on the physical 
environment and in proper context. The context was that the 
site had been used for 30 years for the manufacture of kitchen, 
cleaning and laundry products including steel wool soap pads. 
The proposed use which was to be on a small scale purely for 
the manufacture of soap for the steel wool pads and was 
therefore incidental to the existing activities. Furthermore the 
manufacturer could be regulated by a licence issued under the 
Clean Air Act 1972. This meant there would be no discernible 
~~~~~ -~~w~~\ot Borough Council v A. W. Bryant (1984) 10 
28. 
29. 
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28 
odour from the soap manufacturing process at its boundary. 
This case can be contrasted with the decision in 
Davies Properties v Auckland City Council (1972) 4 N. Z. T. P.A. 
205. There the appellant sought consent to erect a plumbers 
workshop, office and storage building in a residential zone. In 
this case it was held that to grant the application would break 
down the stability of the zoning of the neighbourhood. It was 
held that the significance in question is to be measured "not 
only in respect of the immediate vicinity and beyond, but also in 
respect of its significance in relation to the total pattern of 
development defined by the scheme itself". 
A departure that does not increase the existing non-conformity 
h b h ld h l·ttl T PI . . "f' 
29 Th" as een e to ave 1 e own ann1ng s1gn1 1cance. 1s 
is especially so where the proposal is visually appropriate in the 
neighbourhood and the detraction, if any, to the neighbouring 
properties will be minimal. 
The second aspect to be considered as stated in the Mount 
Wellington Borough Council decision is what could broadly be 
termed as the precedent effect of a planning consent. l\lr 
Justice Casey considered this matter also in the Raceway Motors 
v Canterbury R. P.A. decision (supra). It was not argued that 
the doctrine of stare decisis applied to the Tribunal but that the 
Tribunal (or Board as it was then) is bound not to ignore its 
own decisions especially where the factual circumstances are very 
Home Products (NZ) Limited v Mount Roskill Borough Council 
(1979) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 542. 
Re an application by McMillan and Another v Auckland City 
Council (1977) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 310 
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similar. Mr Justice Casey held that the Board was not bound by 
its previous decisions and free to consider each case on its own 
facts and merits. The Board he held was free to take 
previous decisions on similar facts into account if it thought fit 
but its failure to do so was not an error of law. 
Despite the above comments the basic principles of administrative 
law provide that there is a general duty for a Local Body and 
Tribunals to act fairly and reasonably. The real issue arises 
where there are many sites similar to the subject site which 
accordingly dictate that an even handed approach be taken. 
Just as the rules in natural justice provide that offenders who 
are in a similar position should be treated equally so should 
identical applications be accorded equal consideration. This 
aspect was considered in Croxilles Ohu Limited v Marlborough 
County Council (1976) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 74. The appellants sought 
to establish a community in the Rai Valley to manufacture goods 
for sale and produce the group's food with the rest being for 
sale commercially. The land zoning permitted only one dwelling 
house as of right and the appellants sought permission to erect 
nine cottages. The Board held that in the vicinity there were 
large areas of unalienated Crown land and giving consent would 
create a precedent on which similar applications could be based. 
Great difficulty it was said would be experienced in 
distinguishing persons genuinely interested in communal living 
and those merely grouping themselves together for the purpose 
of circumventing the provision of the District Scheme. 
- 24 -
Perhaps the most definitive pronouncement on this issue was 
contained in the decision of O'Connell's Hotel v 
Queenstown/Whakatipu Combined Planning Committee (1970) 3 
N. Z. T. C. P.A. 269. In that case the Board allowed a Hotel to be 
extended beyond the maximum height limit and held that it would 
not set a precedent for other commercial buildings in the area 
and it was not necessary in these circumstances to change the 
scheme due to the circumstances of this particular building. In 
reaching this decision the Board stated the following matter of 
principle which has been applied subsequently: -
" where circumstances in respect of a large number of 
separate areas of land in any zone in a local authority 
District are identical, and cause one of the owners to 
apply for consent to a specified departure, the Local 
Authority would be justified in deciding that the effect of 
granting its consent would have more than little 
significance beyond the immediate vicinity of the 
applicant's land and the District Scheme could not 
properly remain without being changed or varied. The 
basis of that finding will not be the creation of a 
precedent, but a similarity of circumstances which 
logically had to be dealt with in the same way in each 
case". 
Sometimes there are special reasons which enable consent to be 
granted in borderline cases for a limited period of time. It has 
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been stated however that a planning consent should not limited 
in time unless there are special reasons for doing so. They may 
be planning reasons. They may also be reasons found in Section 
74(2)(a) - a use may be justified for a temporary period, and, 
because it is temporary come within the limitations imposed by 
the subsection, whereas a consent unlimited as to time might well 
go beyond those limitations. 
30 In an interesting decision the 
Tribunal one suspects had that principle partly in mind and also 
no doubt the desire not to create any long lasting precedent 
when it gave consent to an application in the decision of La 
Grouw Builders Limited v Rodney County Council (1977) 6 
N. Z. T. P.A. 308. This decision concerned an application to 
construct and periodically replace three show homes in a 
residential area adjacent to a commercial zone. Consent was 
granted on the basis that although the site would be better used 
for residential purposes it may be some time before it was so 
used. The Board therefore gave consent and viewed the consent 
given as allowing an interim or temporary use of the site as it 
believed in due course with the further growth and development 
of Orewa, economics would dictate that full and intensive use of 
the site be made for residential purposes. In a more recent 
decision the Tribunal was more specific - Bailey v Tauranga City 
Council (1984) 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 215. In this case Mr and Mrs 
Bailey were nursery persons who had been growing roses and 
fruit trees in Tauranga for 35 years. Mr Bailey was aged 69 
years of age and wished to use a two acre block of land zoned 
30. Lindsay v Waitamata City Council (1980) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 638 
3,8 
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residential for a fruit tree and rose nursery for a period of up 
to four years. There were to be no permanent plantings and 
the only building to be erected on the site was a temporary 
shed. The City Council's Town Planner gave evidence that the 
more readily developerable residential land in the City would last 
for about 10 years. The Tribunal accordingly granted the 
consent to the Baileys to utilise the land in the manner sought. 
The Tribunal however added the conditions that the consent was 
personal to Mr and Mrs Bailey and did not run with the land. 
The consent was also to subsist for a period of only four years. 
Scheme can remain without change 
In the Davies Properties case referred to earlier the Board 
stated that after consent has been given to a departure 
permitting a non permitted use the question as to whether the 
District Scheme can remain without change will depend on the 
circumstances. It was stated 
"If a public need has been demonstrated for a particular 
use to become established on that site; and if it is not 
appropriate that any other of the uses permitted in the 
zone in which that use is ordinarily to be found should 
become established on that site; and/ or if it is desirable 
that the particular use should remain under specific 
planning control as a non-conforming use, then it can be 
said that the District Scheme can remain without change. 
Once such a new use is established, if there is no reason 
3.9 
31. 
32. 
33. 
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why it should remain under specific planning control, or 
if there is no reason why other uses permitted in the 
zone in which the use is ordinarily to be found should 
not become established on that site, then the District 
Scheme cannot remain without change - the zoning of the 
site must be changed so that the use of the site becomes 
a conforming use, and so that the District Scheme can 
remain an honest document". 
The scheme cannot remain an honest document if consent will 
amount to a de facto re-zoning of the land 
31 in such cases a 
variation or re-zoning is required. Where there is no provision 
in the District Scheme for such uses and the need exists e.g. 
for a CNG retail sales outlet in 1981 
32 there is no threat to the 
integrity or honesty of the District Scheme. Where the consent 
sought relates to a general standard or ordinance e.g. 
residential use or subdivision a scheme change is the appropriate 
tool in fairness to the other land owners and to preserve the 
accuracy of the District Scheme. 
3 3 
Urgent Applications 
Subsection 2 (b) of Section 7 4 deals with urgent applications made 
in relation to a scheme change or variation that has been notified 
pursuant to a resolution passed by the Local Authority prior to 
the completion of the formalities. 
O'Connor v Waimea County Council (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 40 
Whangarei City Council v Whangarei City Council (1975) B.C.L. 
807 
Bhula v Lower Hutt City Council (1981) 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 174 
Ha1moana v Raglan County Council (1978) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 447 
34. 
35. 
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It is a supplementary provision to Section 7 4A which permits 
non-permitted and conditional uses and waivers under the 
Operative District Scheme where such uses are in conformity 
with the new scheme or scheme change and the appeal process 
has been satisfied. 
It is not possible to utilise this subsection until the resolution 
has been actually passed by the Local Authority. A resolution 
stating that it was the Local Authority's intention to review 
certain provisions of the District Scheme is insufficient. 
34 
The urgency that is required to be present must not be borne 
from private interests but of public necessity. It was held in 
GUS Properties Limited v Timaru City Council (1971) 4 
N.Z.T.P.A. 12 that:-
"A desire to take advantage of an existing market in a new 
way and to be ahead of competitors does not in the 
opinion of the Board constitute urgency. The subsection 
contemplates urgency of a particular and irresistible kind 
which demands action to protect or enhance the public 
(not just private) interest". 
The plight of a businessman whose premises became too small due 
to rapid expansion was held not to satisfy this test. 
35 
One is 
lead to question the consistency of approach when comparing 
Butler v New Plymouth City Council (1969) N.Z.T.C.P.A. 213 
Alexander v Christchurch City Council (1970) 3 N. Z. T. P.A. 271 
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these decisions declining applications in such circumstances to 
those decisions of the Tribunal in the "hardship" cases ref erred 
to earlier where consent had been given under Section 74(2) (a). 
The application must also protect and enhance the public interest 
under Section 74(2) (b) when if pursued pursuant to Section 
74(2)(a) it may not be so vital. 
If private interest is not enough then it is difficult to envisage a 
situation where the public interest would need protection 
pursuant to this emergency type procedure. If the scheme 
change or variation was proceeding it is difficult to envisage how 
the speeding up of the procedural process could protect the 
public interest. It is not difficult to comprehend that the 
speeding up of the process could enhance the public interest by 
allowing a desirable use to become operative sooner but the 
ability to provide protection seems doubtful. 
3 .10 Subdivisional Allotments 
Section 7 4 ( 4) is a special section dealing with sub divisional 
allotments. This Section only applies when certain narrow 
specified criteria are satisfied. Not the least of these criteria is 
that the applicant must have owned the land at the time when 
the actual subdivision limitation in the District Scheme first 
became operative. The provision is so special and limited that it 
does not require consideration in the context of this paper. 
3 .11 
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Special Reasons 
Section 69(2) of the Act provides:-
" ( 2) In determining any appeal against the decision of 
the Council under Section 7 4 of this Act, the 
Tribunal shall observe the limitations set out in 
subsection (2) of that section; but the Tribunal 
may allow a specified departure from the scheme 
if, for special reasons specified by the Tribunal, 
it finds the specified departure is warranted in the 
public interest in the particular circumstances of 
the case". 
The case of Schultz v Paparua County Council ( supra) was one 
of the first reported decisions under Section 69(2) of the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1977 which differed significantly from 
the corresponding section in the previous Act. The appeal was 
actually commenced under the 1953 Act but determined pursuant 
to the present Act. 
In examining this section the Tribunal quite properly "observed 
the limitations" set out in Section 74(2). The Tribunal stated 
that pursuant to that wording they were required to firstly look 
at the provisions of Section 7 4 ( 2). They reviewed the evidence 
to see if they could grant consent purely on the basis of 
satisfying the criteria of Section 74(2). After determining that 
they could not they then looked at the provisions of Section 
36. 
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69(2). This approach was confirmed as being correct by Mr 
Justice White in the High Court decision of Pinfolds Transport 
Limited v Wairarapa South County Council (1981) 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 
93 when he referred to that section as conferring on the 
Tribunal an additional power. The wording of the section is 
that the Tribunal may allow a specified departure for special 
reasons. However in this decision the Court held that although 
the Tribunal had an additional discretionary power it was a 
facility it was obliged to exercise when considering an application 
for a specified departure. The High Court held that the facts 
indicated the Tribunal had not considered the matter pursuant to 
its powers under Section 69(2) and accordingly allowed the 
appeal and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further 
consideration. The Court held: -
II it can be said that in the present case all matters 
affecting the public must be weighed in applying the 
provisions of Section 74(2) and 69(2), the latter raising a 
specific question for the Tribunal's determination on the 
evidence". 
The Tribunal held in the Schultz case that the use of the word 
"special" was an indication by the Legislature that before the 
Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction under Section 69 ( 2) it must be 
satisfied that it was dealing with "a very exceptional set of 
circumstances". It is a power that should be exercised in only 
36 
rare cases. It has been said by Mr Justice Cooke: -
Schultz v Paparua County Council (1978) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 532 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
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"What Section 69 ( 2) requires is special reasons applicable 
to particular circumstances - not unique reasons that can 
never be applicable to other cases". 
37 
Consent has been granted under Section 69(2) where the Local 
Authority has been lax in enforcing the provisions of its District 
Scheme and where the scheme is inadequate. In such 
circumstances consent was granted for 4½ years 
38 , 5 years 
39 
and for 3 years where the Local Authority has been simply lax 
in enforcing its District Scheme. 
40 
The inactivity of the Local Authority or the failure of the 
District Scheme to provide for a particular use will not always be 
sufficient to persuade the Tribunal to exercise its discreation 
under Section 69(2). It is very much a case of the Tribunal 
balancing the various interests when weighing up what is 
required in the public interest. In the case of Burns v Franklin 
County Council (1984) 10 N. Z. T. P.A. 25 the Tribunal considered 
an application seeking permission to enable a number of mobile 
homes to become permanent homes in a caravan park in an area 
zoned rural. It was argued that there was no provision in the 
District Scheme for such sites and there was a clear need for 
such accommodation. It was argued there was a serious of 
shortage of cheap housing in the area and a refusal would create 
a real hardship for those now living semi-permanently in the 
North Taranaki Environment Protection Association v Governor 
General (1983) 1 N.Z.L.R. 312 
Roozen & Fryer v Marlborough County Council 11 March 1980 
Division No. 3 (unreported) 
Waitaki Transport (Holdings) Limited v Waiheno County Council 3 
March 1982 Division No. 3 (unreported) 
Blakely v Waimari District Council (1983) 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 246 
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caravan park. To be considered against this plea was the fact 
that the proposed review of the regional scheme stated holiday 
caravan parks should not become de facto settlements. The 
Tribunal in exercising its discretion stated that the inaction of 
the Local Authority did not justify omitting proper planning for 
the use or authorising ad hoe decision making. The Tribunal 
had greater difficulty in balancing the plight of the homeless 
against the abstract concepts of sound planning practise. In 
deciding against the application the Tribunal held that after 
balancing all matters it would be doing a long term disservice to 
the homeless to grant consent. It concluded that it would not 
be in the public interest to yield to expediency. 
Whether the honest belief that one is doing the right thing will 
be enough to qualify is doubtful. It has been cited as one of 
the reasons with varying degrees of success. It was not enough 
to carry the day in Rattray v Christchurch City Council (1983) 
9 N. Z. T. P.A. 385. It was however one of the reasons in Deaker 
v Heathcote County Council (1984) 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 39 which 
helped persuade the Tribunal it should exercise its discretion. 
Not surprisingly the Tribunal has held where an applicant has 
flagrantly breached the terms of the planning consent granted to 
it and as a result and in doing so established at considerable 
cost a non conforming use the applicant could not plead 
exceptional circumstances when it was commercially and 
financially embarrassed when its own misdeeds were uncovered. 
41 
41. Kitto v Manakau City Council (1981) N.Z.T.P.A. 211 
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It is impossible to try and set out a definitive list of criteria 
that one may seek to establish exists in order to successfully 
sway the Tribunal to exercise its discretion under Section 69(2). 
It is not surprising as it has been held that the decision to 
determine what might or might not be in the public interest for 
the purpose of Section 69 ( 2) must eventually become an exercise 
in intuitive judgment after weighing the quality and significance 
of the subject matter inside its relative factual environment. In 
the final analysis it is all a question of degree and 
. t 42 c1rcums ances. 
Whilst one can appreciate that the advocates for greater 
flexibility would praise this provision giving the Tribunal the 
power and means to provide justice for each particular individual 
set of circumstances it must seriously undermine the certainty of 
any scheme. Although the Tribunal have been anxious not to 
allow the exigencies of a particular case to outweigh the 
desirability of retaining a consistent and reliable scheme, the 
very existence of the discretion must pose a threat. The 
Tribunal in the Deaker decision wasn't putting at risk the 
certainty of the scheme but in many ways was getting around an 
unfairness caused to the appellants by the Local Authority's 
failure to rectify its ordinances in the wake of the Donald Design 
decision. Conversely consent was refused in the Burn's decision 
because the reliability of the present scheme may well to some 
degree have "gone out the window" if consent had been given. 
So the Tribunal does appear to be mindful of the situation but it 
is a provision that is surely open to abuse. Because it relies on 
42. From Shepperd & McVeagh (Town Planning) cited with approval 
in Centrepoint Growth Trust v Takapuna City Council HC M59683 
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a question of judgment unless the Tribunal was quite amiss in 
the way it went about its consideration of this issue it is even 
difficult to see how the High Court can effectively remedy the 
situation in dealing with an appeal which is restricted to points 
of law. 
A further question that arises in respect of the purpose of 
Section 69(2) is the fact that it provides the Tribunal with a 
discretion and remedy which is not available to the Local 
Authority. It is applicable when the criteria of Section 74(2) (a) 
cannot be satisfied. It therefore encourages appeals as even if 
an applicant believes he can show special reasons but knows he 
cannot satisfy the criteria of Section 74(2) (a) he must proceed 
with a full hearing through the Local Authority. The Tribunal 
have ruled that the applicant must call all evidence before the 
Local Authority if he wants to call the same before the Tribunal. 
It therefore does appear in such circumstances that the initial 
hearing amounts to somewhat of a fool's errand simply for the 
purpose of obtaining appeal rights. Is the intuitive judgment of 
the Tribunal so much better than that of the Local Authority? 
Why should the Tribunal have this special discretionary power in 
respect of specified departure applications and not others? 
These questions are difficult to answer. They seem to raise 
doubt as to the consistency of the legislation. Apart from this 
aspect the Local Authority and Tribunal hearings could have 
been seen to have been a consistent two stage approach even 
allowing for the fact that the Tribunal hearing involves a 
hearing "de novo". This special reservation of a discretionary 
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power for the sole use of the Tribunal on appeal is inconsistent. 
Although limited in its applicability I suggest it undermines the 
consistency and logic of the system. If a limited orderly degree 
of residual flexibility is required when dealing with specified 
departure applications then why should the Local Authority be 
excluded from utilising this power. The answer to that question 
is not readily apparent to this writer. 
3 .12 Survey Results 
The results of the survey referred to earlier are set out in 
annex 1 at the back of this paper. The information obtained is 
not precise as the questionnaire was relatively brief and general to 
encourage a wide and immediate response. Various caveats and 
conditions were added to the replies and accordingly the 
information contained can not be regarded as particularly 
accurate. It is submitted however that the survey was 
sufficiently comprehensive to enable a reasonable insight to be 
obtained as to how Local Authorities treat specified departure 
applications. 
Considering the fact that specified departure should only be 
granted in exceptional circumstances the results are to some 
extent alarming. Many responses noted that great care was 
taken in vetting the application. In many cases it is not known 
whether the percentage figures given take into account 
applications that were lodged and subsequently withdrawn, in 
some cases this was recorded. 
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Given the high across the board success rate one must seriously 
consider whether the Local Authorities understand on what legal 
basis they should be considering specified departure 
applications. The results could possibly be an aberration as a 
number of Local Authorities indicated that following the Donald 
Design decision they treated all dispensation and waiver 
applications as specified departure applications and some still do. 
This from the comments received and seeing other statistics is 
not believed however to be a significant factor. Several 
recipients indicated that their percentage figures were relatively 
constant. It is recognised that some of the Boroughs in 
particular deal numerically with very few specified departure 
applications but still concern must be had for the results 
obtained. 
A survey of specified departure applications consented to on 
appeal would provide a most interesting contrast. This writer is 
reasonably sure that the percentages would not be nearly as 
high. This would be due to the more legalistic approach adopted 
by the Planning Tribunal. As regards applications for 
conditional use and waivers one can accept that this is not so 
important. The apparent failure of most Local Authorities to 
seriously apply the stringent specified departure criteria tests 
must however be considered with real concern. If this is not 
done the value and veracity of District Schemes are in jeopardy. 
The expected discrepancies between the figures produced by the 
smaller Boroughs as compared with the larger cities failed to 
4.1 
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emerge to the degree anticipated. This may be due to the 
limitations of the survey but one could confidently say that in 
any event the discrepancies are unlikely to be as great as this 
writer would have expected. 
The results could indicate that the specified departure 
applications are very carefully checked by the applicants prior 
to filing or on filing many are dissuaded by the Local Authority 
before they are proceeded with further. This I believe however 
may be true in part but it is stretching ones credibility to 
suggest that it is as prevalent as the outcome of the survey 
would have us believe if Local Authorities were strictly applying 
the legal criteria. 
4 CONDITIONAL USES 
Preliminary 
A conditional use is defined in Section 2 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977: -
"'Conditional Use' means any use specified in the operative 
District Scheme as a conditional use". 
This type of use was first officially recognised in 1966. There 
was in 1960 a regulation which allowed a use specified in the 
ordinances that would be permitted only with Council consent 
and subject to any conditions which might be imposed. Now the 
situation is more certain. Section 36 ( 4) of the Act states: -
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" ( 4) Every District Scheme may distinguish between 
classes of use or development in all or any part or 
parts of the district in any one or more of the 
following ways or any combination of them: 
(a) Those which are permitted as of right 
provided that they comply in all respects 
with all controls, restrictions, prohibitions, 
and conditions specified in the scheme: 
(b) Those which are appropriate to the area but 
which may not be appropriate on every site 
or may require special conditions and which 
require approval as conditional uses under 
Section 72 of this Act: 
(c) II 
Section 72 of the Act provides:-
"Conditional uses -
(1) Every application for the Council's consent to a 
conditional use of any land or building shall be by 
way of a notified application. 
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( 2) Subject to Section 3 of this Act, in considering an 
application for consent to a conditional use, the 
Council shall have regard to-
(a) The suitability of the site for the proposed 
use determined by reference to the 
provisions of the operative District Scheme; 
and 
(b) The likely effect of the proposed use on the 
existing and foreseeable future amenities of 
the neighbourhood, and on the health, 
safety, convenience, and the economic, 
cultural, social, and general welfare of the 
people of the district". 
4 .2 General 
43. 
Whilst a predominant use is permitted as of right in a zone a 
conditional use is one that is generally suitable for the zone but 
not necessarily suitable for any particular site. It is necessary 
as stated in Section 72(1) to make a notified application for a 
conditional use. Although many District Schemes don't, it has 
been held that a District Scheme should contain express 
provisions on which the suitability of a site for a particular class 
of conditional uses may be judged. 
43 
A conditional use has to 
be judged by examining the list of conditional uses cited in 
Watson v Manakau City Council D.A 20/84 
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the Code of Ordinances. It follows therefore that where there is 
no Code of Ordinances i.e. no Operative District Scheme there 
b d . . l 44 can e no con 1tiona uses. A conditional use application is 
considered in light of the criteria specified in section 72(2). An 
examination of those criteria will follow but firstly it is relevant 
to trace the development of a time old argument as to whether 
the Council and Tribunal can exercise an overriding discretion 
as to whether to grant consent and consider matters over and 
beyond those specifically mentioned in section 72(2). 
4 . 3 Discretion 
The argument first began in 1964 and was last adjudicated upon 
by the Court of Appeal in December 1984. The basic issue is 
whether when considering a conditional use application the Local 
Authority and Tribunal are entitled to have regard to general 
planning factors when considering the question of site suitability 
and whether there is a prima facie presumption that the site is 
suitable once the use is shown to come within the class of 
conditional uses prescribed in the Code of Ordinances. 
The first case was McNamara v Waimairi County Council (1964) 2 
N. Z. T. P. C. A. 146. The appellants sought permission to erect a 
garage and a petrol station in Waimairi, Christchurch. The land 
in question was zoned Residential A but such a business was a 
conditional use. The Local Authority declined the application 
following many objections and an appeal to the Board followed. 
The Board considered its discretion in terms of the then 
legislation and stated: -
44, Barr v Blenheim Borough Council (1980) 2 N.Z.L.R. l(CA) 
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"In other terms, a council has a discretion. A discretion 
of this nature, however, is not to be exercised 
arbitrarily. While regard must, of course, be had to the 
particular circumstances of each individual case, the 
Board takes the view that, when any particular use is 
included in a code as a "conditional use" it is to be 
assumed that, in general terms, it is a use suitable to the 
zone in question, though not necessarily suitable in 
respect of every particular site in such zone". 
The Board allowed the appeal and a significant factor was that it 
saw its discretion limited in the above way. 
Following this decision there was a legislative change in 1966 to 
provide a uniform procedure and direct appeal rights for 
conditional use applications. It is doubtful however whether 
such a change made a significant difference to the issue. 
Despite this the change in the legislation was utilised to allow a 
special Board to reach a different conclusion as to its discretion. 
The decision was Mobil Oil (NZ) Limited v Napier City Council 
(1968) 3 N. Z. T. P. C. A. 82. The facts were similar but the 
location different. Mobil applied for consent to erect a service 
station on land zoned Residential A in Na pier. Once again such 
a business was a conditional use. The Local Authority refused 
consent and the special Board considered its discretion. It 
noted that the ratio decidendi in McN amara had been 
subsequently applied consistently by the Board. However it 
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contended that the 1966 Amendment Act enabled it to decide the 
issue differently. It held: -
"The Board does not believe that it should fetter its own 
jurisdiction, extended as it is by statute, in this manner. 
To do so, would to a large extent nullify the newly 
created rights of persons affected, to object to the 
granting of a conditional use. Further, the Board holds 
the view that to follow , simpliciter, the dictum in 
McNamara's case in all appeals under Section 28D would 
result in the virtual disappearance of conditional uses 
from the ordinances of district planning schemes. The 
Board is aware of a tendency in this direction already. 
The specification of conditional uses in ordinances is a 
planning tool, the usefulness of which should not be 
diminished by the application of a rule established under 
different legislation and in circumstances where the public 
interest could be safeguarded by other means". 
Later in 1968 another special Board considered the conflict 
between the McNamara and Mobil decisions. This was in the case 
of Blackwood Wilson Properties Limited v Petone Borough Council 
(1968) 3 N.Z.T.C.P.A. 157. The application sought consent to 
enable a dairy/ grocery to be established in a residential area but 
the facts are not particularly relevant. The Chairman 
acknowledged uncertainty prevailed because of the conflict 
between the two decisions. To resolve this conflict he 
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determined that the McN amara decision did not as it had been 
contended mean that where an application for a conditional use 
was made the site relevant to the application was to be 
considered prima facie suitable for the use for which consent was 
sought. He said that in both decisions it was agreed that the 
suitability of the site was the real question to be determined and 
for this purpose matters of public interest were relevant. 
So the point reached after the 1966 amendment was that both the 
merits of the site and the wider public interest were considered 
relevant. 
Since 1977 we have had the present provisions cited earlier i.e. 
Section 36 ( 4) and Section 72 but the dispute continues. It came 
to a head and has hopefully been determined by the Court of 
Appeal in Foodtown Supermarkets Limited v Auckland City 
Council (1984) 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 262. That decision however had 
its beginnings earlier. 
The facts of the case were that Lynley Buildings Limited sought 
planning consent to erect a supermarket having a gross floor 
area of 1, 770m 2 in Glenn Innes. The site was zoned Industrial E 
and shops were a conditional use in the Auckland City District 
Scheme. The nearest substantial shopping centres were 1km to 
the north and 1. 3km to the south. 
The Auckland City Council refused planning consent on the 
grounds that the proposal was contrary to the scheme statement 
45. 
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policies on commercial development which aimed to encourage the 
consolidation of existing commercial centres, and was likely to 
have a significantly adverse effect on the commercial viability of 
the area to the detriment of the convenience, economic and 
general welfare of the people of the district. 
Lynley Buildings Limited appealed to the Tribunal. The appeal 
was refused by the Tribunal. 
45 Of the Tribunal's findings three 
are relevant. The Tribunal held: -
1. In considering a conditional use application the discretion 
should be exercised against the background that the use 
was appropriate to the area generally, but might not be 
appropriate on every site. 
2 . When considering· the matters referred to in section 
72(2)(a) and (b) and in forming an overall judgement, 
the proposal should not be seen as a shop in general but 
as the particular shop which was the subject of the 
application, with its nature, its scale and the 
characteristics which it was likely to have. 
4. The suitability of the site should be determined by 
reference to all the provisions of the District Scheme and 
Lynley Buildings Limited v Auckland City Council (1983) 9 
N. Z. T. P.A. 266. 
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account should be taken of the totality of those provisions 
relative to the proposal. The proposed use being a 
commercial use (albeit in an industrial zone,) regard 
should be had to the provisions of the scheme relating to 
commercial development and commercial zoning policies. 
The decision was taken on appeal to the High Court. Counsel 
for the appellant stressed the need for certainty in planning 
matters. He argued that the criteria of Section 72(2) were 
applicable only in considering the specific site and the use 
proposed for it, and that the Tribunal had erred in considering 
the suitability of the use rather than of the site. Mr Justice 
Casey in accepting this argument after considering the 
previously mentioned decisions on this issue held that: -
II the combined effect of Sections 36(4)(b) and 72(2) 
of the 1977 Act was to limit the Council in this instance 
to considering the relationship between the particular site 
and the particular supermarket. Questions about the 
suitability of the use generally in the zone, whether by 
reference to other parts of the scheme or to general 
planning principles, were not relevant. The matters 
specified in Section 72(2)(b) are distinct from the 
site-related matters referred to in Section 72(2)(a), and 
hence the discretion under paragraph (b) must be limited 
to the matters set out in that paragraph, and does not 
permit an unrestricted resort to general planning 
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principles. The Tribunal had erred by assuming an 
overall discretionary judgment based on planning 
justification, whereby it felt entitled to override the 
ordinance which declared in effect that supermarkets 
without restriction on size or character were appropriate 
in the zone". 
The Court on the above basis remitted the case back to the 
Planning Tribunal for further consideration. 
The matter did not end there for as previously mentioned one of 
the objectors Foodtown Supermarkets Limited, took the matter to 
the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the Local 
Authority and Tribunal were entitled, on a conditional use 
application, to have regard to the District Scheme as a whole 
and in particular to policies set out in the scheme statement, and 
were not restricted to the wording of the ordinances governing 
the particular zone. The Court of Appeal vacated the High 
Court's findings and held the Tribunal's findings were not wrong 
in law and held that the Tribunal's dismissal of the appeal 
should stand. Of particular interest was this statement of Mr 
Justice Cooke: -
"Each application has to be considered on its merits, but 
any relevant planning policies embodied in the scheme as 
a whole must always be a legitimate consideration. The 
emphasis laid for the present applicant on certainty is, 
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with all respect to the argument, misplaced. Certainty is 
one desideratum in planning law, but in zoning matters it 
is given effect primarily by predominant uses. The very 
nature of conditional uses means that, while any such use 
qualifies for consideration, there is no presumption that it 
will be allowed in any given case". 
4. 4 Conclusion 
46. 
47. 
The Court of Appeal decision is far removed from the ratio 
decidendi of the McNamara decision. It will be of considerable 
comfort for those seeking greater flexibility in the town planning 
decision making process. It certainly means that applicants for 
conditional use consents cannot simply rely on establishing that 
the proposed use comes within one of the listed conditional uses 
and that the site is suitable for the proposed use. The question 
must be raised however as to whether the conditional use 
procedure in this light now to some extent overlaps with the 
discretionary use procedure provided for in Section 36(4)(c). 
There may be some degree of overlap but the crucial point is 
perhaps that the discretion is fettered at least to some extent by 
the criteria set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 72. 
Where regard was had to some of the considerations to paragraph 
(a) but virtually no consideration was given to the criteria of 
paragraph (b) the conditional use consent was set aside. 
46 
Whilst it is not necessary in a decision to refer slavishly to the 
criteria of the section 
47 
it would clearly be desirable to indicate 
that the discretion was exercised with reference to the relevant 
criteria. 
Small v Christchurch City Council S.Ct 24/8/77 
Nippert v Admiral Wellmgton Properties S. Ct WNM 450/78 
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CRITERIA 
4.5 Matters of National Importance 
In determining any conditional use application a Local Authority 
and the Tribunal are required to recognise the matters of 
national importance specified in Section 3 of the Act. Whilst it 
is not necessary to show evidence of the need for the proposed 
use in an absolute sense 
48 
it would certainly be necessary to 
rebut any presumption that the proposed use was contrary to a 
matter of national importance. Where the extension of a factory 
on high value rural land was permitted as a conditional use, 
approval was given only after 13 conditions were imposed. 
49 In 
that case the amount of food production likely to be lost by 
using the extra ground was held to be minimal. A contrasting 
decision was where consent was refused to abstract sand from a 
beach front. In that case the removal of the sand was likely to 
50 
adversely and permanently affect the beach. 
Whether the matters likely to be of national importance will 
prevail will undoubtedly depend on the extent of any detrimental 
affect, the need for the proposed use, any hardship likely to be 
caused by declining the application and any other options that 
may be available. There is no rule that Section 3 matters have 
overriding importance in determining Section 72 applications. 
51 
48. National Trading Company Limited v Tauranga City Council D .A 
23/85 
49. New Zealand Particle Board Limited v Rodney County Council 
(1976) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 1 
50. The Proprietors of Mataroa Nos. 1 and 2 v Ohinemuri County 
Council (1978) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 406 
51. Allens Service Station v Glen Eden Borough Council (1985) 10 
N. Z. 1'. P.A. 400 
4.6 
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Site Suitability 
The scheme may refer to minimum size requirements for a site. 
If so, this is then a matter of primary importance. Where bulk 
and location standards apply to conditional uses these can be 
used to assess the suitability of the site. If a proposed use 
slightly infringes any of the aspects it is more likely to be 
approved than if in infringes more significantly. In such cases 
where the infringement is almost 50% or greater such applications 
may be treated as applications for a specified departure. Where 
no standards are applicable general planning principles must be 
utilised. It is not appropriate to consider the application in 
light of the requirements for predominant uses. 
52 
In the Van Duyn decision the Board listed what it considered to 
be relevant factors to be taken into consideration in assessing 
the suitability of a particular site and of the likely effect of the 
proposed use. These were:-
( a) The exact nature of the proposed use, e.g. football 
training, games of chess. 
(b) The intensity of the proposed use, i.e. the average 
number of people who will be on the site at any one time , 
the hours during which activities will be carried on and 
the maximum number of persons to be accommodated. 
(c) The nature of the buildings to be erected for the 
accommodation of the proposed use, in the light of the 
exact nature of the proposed use. 
52. Van Duyn v Takapuna City Council (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 1 
53. 
54. 
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(d) The location of those buildings on the site and in relation 
to the buildings erected (or which would be permitted to 
be erected) on adjoining properties. 
(e) The number of motor vehicles likely to be attracted to the 
proposed use, the ability of the site to accommodate them, 
the nature of the street pattern in the locality, and the 
relationship of the site to main distributor roads. 
(f) The ability of the site to allow for the insulation of 
adjoining properties from any noise which is likely to 
arise from the proposed use itself and from the movement 
of people and vehicles to and from the site. 
(g) The size of the site having regard to all the foregoing 
factors. 
It is not open for the Local Authority or the Tribunal to 
consider the proposed site in relation to alternative sites. The 
Tribunal overturned a decision to allow a proposed camping 
ground to be established next to a large scale honey complex 
that already existed even although the site was suitable because 
the two uses were clearly not compatible. 
53 The Tribunal has 
held such arguments raising the possibility of other more 
54 
suitable sites to be of no relevance. Consent should not be 
refused because the Local Authority does not believe that the 
Arataki Honey Limited v Rotorua District Council (1984) 10 
N.Z.T.P.A. 180 
Presbyterian Trustees v Wellington City Council (1973) 4 
N.Z.T.P.A. 433 
4.7 
55. 
56. 
57. 
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proposal does not make the best use of the site. Whilst 
attention must be given to whether the proposed use is 
appropriate to the subject site and whether the subject site is a 
suitable site consent should not be refused because another 
possible site exists which may be a better site. 
55 The economics 
of the matter has been also held to be an irrelevant 
consideration which is consistent with the Tribunal's view that 
their function is not concerned with the end use. 
56 Similarly, 
the anticipated conduct of persons who may use the site if 
consent is granted has been held an irrelevant consideration. 
57 
What someone may do in the future if consent is granted is a 
common fear of objectors but the High Court has ruled that if 
the anticipated uses are illegal then as far as the planning 
application is concerned these fears are not valid grounds for 
refusing consent. Questions as to the suitability of the site may 
also be relevant in considering the likely effect on the amenities 
of the neighbourhood. 
Amenities of the Neighbourhood 
Section 74(2) (b) sets out the various matters to be examined 
when considering the impact of the proposed use on the 
neighbourhood and the people who live in it. It has been held 
that:-
"the amenities of a neighbourhood are unique to that 
neighbourhood. Some qualities and conditions in a 
Liquigas v Manakau City Council (1983) 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 193 
Auckland Christian Schools Trust v Manakau City Council (1979) 
D.B. 1449 
Barry v Auckland City Council (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 646 
58. 
59. 
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neighbourhood may be relatively unimportant or even 
totally insignificant in relation to the overall qualities and 
conditions constituting the amenities of that 
neighbourhood, and a proposed change in those qualities 
and conditions may affect appreciably only a few persons 
who enjoy the amenities of that neighbourhood. Other 
qualities and conditions may be important or even 
fundamental in relation to the amenities of that 
neighbourhood; and a proposed change in them may affect 
appreciably all the persons who enjoy the amenities of 
that neighbourhood. In the latter case all the persons in 
that neighbourhood can properly claim to be affected if 
the proposal is one to which the provisions of Section 
28(C) apply; and that consequently they have a right of 
objection and appeal. That, however, does not make the 
right of objection and appeal open to the public 
g·enerally; the right is open to those who belong to the 
neighbourhood and who will be appreciably affected". 
58 
The Tribunal has held in considering a case involving the 
occupants of rest home that under Section 72 (2) it is not 
required to have regard to the particular individuals who happen 
to reside in the immediate vicinity, nor to any characteristics or 
needs that may be peculiar to them and not shared in common 
with the rest of the community generally. 
59 
Hadley v Opotiki County Council (1972) 4 N. Z. T. P.A. 443 
Lines v Onehunga Borough Council (1980) 7 N.Z.T.P.A. 346 
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The Tribunal has however on the other hand been prepared to 
recognise the prior claims of an existing activity in an area. 
60 
The Tribunal has had to volley back and forth the merits in 
respect of night tennis. The Board recognised the fact that the 
tennis club had been established since the turn of the century 
and that the residencies had grown up around it 
61 and in 
another more recent similar case on this issue the Tribunal tried 
to strike a reasonable balance after weighing up the community 
value of the tennis club against the detrimental effect the 
lighting would have on the amenities of the neighbourhood. 
62 
The balance was struck by allowing some of the central courts to 
be used for night tennis. This decision is consistent with the 
fact that it has been held that a conditional use may have some 
adverse effects upon existing and future amenities; but provided 
the adverse effect is not too undue in all the circumstances, it 
may be proper to give consent after having regard to all matters 
specified in section 72(2)(b). 
63 
As regards to the health and safety of people the Court has held 
that not only the physical but also the psychological health of 
persons is a relevant consideration. The Court has held "if the 
evidence establishes fear and consequential harm (actual or 
potential) the Tribunal is required to give that such weight as it 
thinks fit, along with all the other relevant evidence and 
circumstances". 
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60. Expans Holdings Limited v Auckland District Land Registrar 
(1972) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 437 
61. Eden-Epsom Tennis Club v Mount Eden Borough Council (1976) 6 
N.Z.T.P.A. 17 
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The safety of persons living near proposed shooting ranges has not 
unnaturally been considered. The possibility of accidents occurring 
was taken into account. The effect of increased traffic is a common 
concern. The benefits from the proposed use have to be weighed up 
against the degree of the harm likely to be caused. Where the increase 
in traffic volume was slight although likely to bring about some change 
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to the character of the neighbourhood consent was granted. 
It would not be possible to canvas all of the factors likely to be 
taken into account in considering these matters and in any event 
they change as time passes and social attitudes change. This is 
reinforced in a passage from Centrepoint Community Growth 
Trust v Takapuna City Council (1978) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 503 where 
at page 507 it was stated:-
"With the coming into force of the 1977 Act, the promoting 
and safeguarding of "the economic, cultural, social and 
general welfare of the people" has become one of the 
objects of district planning; the conservation, protection 
and enhancement of the cultural and social environment 
has been declared to be of national importance. At this 
stage we do not have any clear understanding of how 
those ends are to be achieved through the planning 
process. But we record that the underlying philosophy 
of the British law has for centuries been the recognition 
of individual freedom and liberty except to the extent 
65. Norris Avenue (Tauranga) Hall Trust Board v Tauranga City 
Council (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 141 
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necessary to achieve the common good. Therefore, the 
new provisions in the Planning Act must, in our view 
mean that for a start planning must allow a diversity in 
social behaviour; and that it may restrict that behaviour 
only when necessary for the common good. Applied to 
this case we believe that those new provisions require 
that, subject to this proviso to follow, and subject to the 
other relevant land use considerations, planning gives the 
members of the appellant community the opportunity to 
adopt the lifestyle they desire, notwithstanding that it 
may be a lifestyle foreign to or even criticised by others. 
The proviso is that in living in the manner they desire, 
members of the community must not adversely affect the 
cultural, social and general welfare of the other people of 
the district". 
4. 8 Conditions 
It is not uncommon for conditions to be imposed when granting 
conditional use application. Section 67 of the Act allows 
conditions to be imposed when granting consent to a general 
application. This applies to both Local Authority and the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal has also the power to impose conditions 
of its own initiative during an appeal hearing - Section 150. 
As regards the restrictions on imposing conditions the leading 
commonwealth case is Fawcett Properties Limited v Buckingham 
County Council (1961) A. C. 636(HL). In analysing the 
attachment of conditions to planning consents the House of Lords 
held:-
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1. The condition must be certain (but a condition had to be 
very vague or ambiguous before it became "uncertain"). 
2. The condition must fairly and reasonably relate to the 
permission to which it is attached; and 
3. The condition must not be ultra vires the powers of the 
Local Authority. 
The above principles are equally applicable in New Zealand. The 
Court of Appeal in Turner v Allison (1971) 4 N.Z.T.P.C.A. 104 
added a gloss to the law in the Fawcett Properties case holding 
that an improper condition or part of a condition may be severed 
from the Town Planning consent if this condition is not essential 
or integral to the consent. 
The position was perhaps best summarised New Zealand in the 
case of Onehunga Timber Holdings Limited & Another v Rotorua 
City Council (1971) 4 N .Z. T .P.A. 38. In that case it was held 
that the power to impose conditions when granting an application 
for conditional use consent is not a power to impose any 
condition of any kind that the Council may think fit. It is a 
power to impose conditions with respect to matters relevant, or 
reasonably capable of being regarded as relevant, to the 
implementation of planning policy. Conditions must be reasonable 
in all the circumstances of the case. If the conditions are found 
to be reasonable when related to such matters as the future 
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amenities of the neighbourhood etc. but the property owner 
finds them unreasonably restrictive on the proposed use, then 
the site is unsuitable for the proposed use. 
The types of conditions imposed have related to both the 
construction of dwellings and the uses to which dwellings and 
properties may be put. Some useful examples are: -
Construction Conditions 
the type of materials to be used 
the number of parking spaces 
the area of open space 
the planting of trees and hedges 
the number of road entrances 
the erection of advertising 
the type of lighting to be used 
the installation of music systems 
Usage Conditions - These have varied from preventing noise to 
prohibiting the use of a building for a T. A. B. agency. Other 
conditions have restricted the days and times at which activities 
can take place whilst other miscellaneous restrictions have been 
imposed pursuant to which successful applicants have been 
required to make payments to the Local Authority in lieu of 
parking requirements, agreed to drain land, purchase the 
neighbouring properties if necessary, and give the neighbour 
the first right of purchase. 
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4. 9 Precedent effect 
Bearing in mind the emphasis on site suitability it is not 
surprising that is has been held there is no precedent value in 
conditional use applications. It has been held that if there were 
the effect would be to write the decision into the Code of 
Ordinances as a predominant use.
66 
4 .10 Survey Results 
66. 
The relationship between the number of conditional use 
applications granted by Local Authorities compared with the 
specified departure applications granted is not particularly 
surprising. With one or two exceptional cases a greater number 
of conditional use applications are granted. Once again however 
the percentage of conditional use applications granted must give 
some cause for concern. Almost half the Local Authorities 
surveyed granted all conditional use applications presented to 
them and this in itself seems staggering. It seems to mean that 
either they have a District Scheme which is particularly 
inadequate or they have a large number of sites which have 
special characteristics which make them appropriate for consent 
to be given in respect of a conditional use application. 
The survey results indicate that there appears to be little 
distinction between the Boroughs, Counties/Districts and Cities. 
This is not all together surprising except that one would have 
have envisaged that the smaller Local Authorities would have had 
Garrett and Another v Christchurch City Council (1977) 6 
N. Z. T .P.A. 193 
5.1 
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less comprehensive District Schemes and therefore had fewer 
successful conditional use applications which thus then justified 
to some extent the increased number of consents given in 
respect of specified departure applications. 
Given the limitations of the survey it is difficult to read too 
much into the results obtained they can however be of little 
comfort to those who would advocate that there should be greater 
certainty in the town planning process. Considered together the 
results as to the outcome of specified departure and conditional 
use applications must lead one to question as to how far one can 
rely on a District Scheme if it is as easy to depart from it as 
the survey results suggest. 
5 DISPENSATIONS AND WAIVERS 
Legal Basis 
As we have seen the District Scheme endeavours to set out what 
could be regarded as the Rule but there are exceptions to all 
rules. The general scheme provisions in every circumstance will 
not encourage the best use of the site and hence the need for 
exceptions by way of specified departure and conditional uses. 
For certain aspects of town planning it is necessary to provide 
the Local Authority and the Tribunal with general discretionary 
powers to keep the system reasonably flexible and to recognise 
that the system is a fluid one. This is done by providing Local 
Authorities with the power to grant dispensations and waivers. 
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5. 2 Historical Development 
67 
The original Town and Country Planning Act 1953 did not 
specifically recognise the need for making exceptions to the 
rules. The Courts however did 
67 and through case law there 
evolved a standard dispensation and waiver ordinance. The 
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 has refined the power of 
Councils to have such ordinances. The power to grant a 
dispensation or waiver from an operative District Scheme must be 
included in the scheme otherwise the Council does not have the 
power. Section 36 ( 6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1977 details what powers may be contained in a District Scheme 
enabling the Council to grant dispensations and waivers in 
respect of certain matters. The Council is not obliged to grant 
itself all or any of these powers when it formulates its 
ordinances. Section 36(6) defines the scope of the powers and 
reads:-
"Any District Scheme may provide for the circumstances 
under which, the manner in which, and the conditions 
subject to which, the Council may grant an application for 
the dispensation wholly or partly from, or waiver of, any 
provision of the District Scheme relating to -
(a) The subdivision of land permitted to be used for 
any urban purpose; 
(b) The height, bulk, and location of buildings 
permitted on site; 
(c) The provision of parking and loading spaces; 
Ideal Laundry Limited v Petone Borough [ 1957 J N. Z. L. R. 1038 
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(d) The design and appearance of verandahs; 
( e) Landscaping; and 
(f) Such other matters as may be specified in that 
behalf by any regulations in force under this 
Act". 
If the consent sought relates to one of the factors listed in 
Section 36(6) regard must then be had to whether it is an 
appropriate case for the granting of such a dispensation or 
waiver. Section 76 (1) of the Act sets out the basis upon which 
an application can be made for the Council's consent to grant 
such a waiver or dispensation. The particular wording of 
sub-section (1) of Section '16 is of considerable interest and 
reads:-
"An application may be made for the Council's consent to a 
dispensation from or waiver of any provision of a District 
Scheme to the extent that is provided for the District 
Scheme pursuant to section 36(6) of this Act". 
The actual criteria to be observed by the Council is set out in 
Section 76(2) which reads:-
"The Council may grant its consent if it is satisfied that 
(a) The dispensation or waiver would encoura ge better 
development of the site or that it is not reasonable 
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or practicable to enforce the provision in respect 
of the particular site; and 
(b) The dispensation or waiver will not detract from 
the amenities of the neighbourhood and will have 
little town and country planning significance 
beyond the immediate vicinity of the land in 
respect of which the dispensation or waiver is 
sought". 
The remainder of the section specifies that if the written 
consents of all interested parties aren't obtained then the 
application for consent must be a notified one unless the Council 
finds that it is unreasonable to require that such consents be 
obtained. 
5. 3 Onus of Proof 
The onus of proof is on the applicant to produce sufficient 
evidence or show sufficient reason to satisfy the Council on the 
balance of probabilities that the criteria set out above have been 
complied with. 
5. 4 Criteria 
It is necessary for the applicant to show that there are 
particular reasons pertaining to this site which should enable the 
proposal to be permitted on its merits although it is not allowed 
as of right under the existing ordinaT\ces. The test although 
involving elements of subjective judgment must be applied in an 
objective way. When considering this criteria the effect of the 
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development or neighbours or neighbouring properties will be 
material. 
5. 5 Enforcement not Reasonable or Practicable 
5.6 
68. 
Whether it is reasonable or practicable to enforce the provisions 
in respect of the particular site clearly by definition involves an 
analysis of the site specific. It is only necessary to show that 
it is either not reasonable or not practicable to enforce the 
provisions to satisfy this particular criteria. In analysing what 
may not be practicable regard will be had to the physical 
difficulties associated with the site or the building due to the 
nature of the design or materials contemplated. On the other 
hand, in determining whether or not the enforcement of the 
ordinances is not reasonable, more general considerations 
relating to the applicant may be taken into account. 
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Existing Amenities 
If the Council is to grant the dispensation or consent it must be 
satisfied that in granting the dispensation or waiver it will not 
detract from the amenities of the neighbourhood. Amenities are 
defined in Section 2 of the Act as being those qualities and 
conditions in an area which contribute to the pleasantness, 
harmony and coherence of the environment and to its better 
enjoyment for any permitted use. The test therefore requires an 
assessment of the proposal against the existing amenities of the 
neighbourhood with some regard being given to the foreseeable 
development permitted as of right within the particular area. 
Findlay v Wellington City Council (1976) 6 N.Z.T.P.A. 76 
5.7 
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Where the proposal detracts from one of the various amenities 
and that detraction is appreciable it is unlikely that a 
dispensation or waiver would be granted. 
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Little Planning Significance 
The dispensation or waiver must have little town and country 
planning significance beyond the immediate vicinity of the land. 
This terminology is used in the criteria that are required to be 
satisfied to obtain a specified departure pursuant to Section 74 
of the Act. The term has been the subject of judicial 
interpretation and to satisfy the term the dispensation or waiver 
sought must not have significant detrimental effects on the actual 
or prospective land uses in the immediate vicinity and beyond. 
The second element to be satisfied is that the precedent effect of 
granting such an application must not be of such planning 
significance to cause particular concern. Where the granting of 
such an application would lead to a series of others it is highly 
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unlikely to be granted. 
5. 8 Applications before Donald Design Decision 
The Local Authorities used to find the procedure of granting 
dispensations and waivers most useful for dealing with what one 
could fairly describe as the less significant run of the mill 
planning matters. The use of this procedure should not be 
under-estimated. It forms a very vital cog in the planning 
machinery as reflected in a survey carried out by the 
Christchurch City Council in 1984 which showed the number of 
69. Straven Services Limited v Waimari County Council [ 1966] 
N.Z.L.R. 966 
70. Highway Motors Limited v Mount Wellington Borough Council 
(1972) 4 N.Z.T.P.A. 220 
5.9 
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dispensation applications processed for the year ending 31st 
March 1983 by some of the larger local authorities: -
Auckland City 
Christchurch City 
Manukau City 
Wellington City 
327 dispensations 
287 dispensations 
698 dispensations 
497 dispensations 
Practical Use of Dispensations and Waivers 
It was a particularly useful device for dealing with relatively 
minor infringements in such aspects as height, side yard or 
parking provisions. The Local Authorities, where the written 
consents were available or it was deemed unreasonable to require 
them, used to operate a fast track procedure. Often a special 
planning committee in the larger cities would meet and have the 
application dealt with in the space of one or two weeks. Alas, 
this has not been the case now for most Local Authorities since 
14 July 1984. It was on that day the Chief Justice, Sir Ronald 
Davison made public the judgment in the case of Donald Design 
Limited and Wellington City Council v Black [ 1984] 10 
N.Z.T.P.A. 80. A leading New Zealand newspaper had a banner 
headline "Planning Edict Throws Council". It is believed that 
the High Court ruling has upset the planning schemes of 
virtually every local authority in the country. The Deputy City 
Planner of the Manukau City Council has reported that in a 
three week period immediately following the release of the 
decision 47 dispensation or waiver applications have had to be 
publicly notified to be processed as specified departure 
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applications as a direct result of the decision. Conversely, the 
Eastbourne Borough Council found that many applications were 
either amended or abandoned to avoid the necessity of a 
hearing. The effect of the decision was that many local Councils 
were quite unsure as to whether or not they still had any 
powers to grant dispensations or waivers. Some local authorities 
like the Christchurch City Council which had detailed ordinances 
setting out the grounds upon which dispensations or waivers 
could be granted may well have felt less pressured by the 
decision but they were in a very small minority. Most local 
authorities mindful of the decision of the High Court in Craig v 
East Coast Bay City Council [1984] BCL 595 in which the Council 
was found to be negligent in unlawfully consenting to a 
dispensation where only a specified departure would authorise 
the particular proposal have opted to suspend the granting of all 
dispensations and waivers until there is either statutory reform 
or they have had the opportunity of reviewing and amending 
their ordinances. Most Councils have been not only unsure as 
regards which way to move but also how far they should move. 
Some Authorities have now drafted scheme changes of two to 
three pages aimed at retaining the earlier flexibility and 
discretionary powers of the Council. One Local Authority is 
proposing to expand the existing two pages in its District 
Scheme relating to dispensations to some 21 pages in trying to 
satisfy what it believes to be the impact of the High Court 
decision. 
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5 .10 Practical Effect Donald Design Decision 
5 .11 
The effect of the decision has been to enormously increase the 
number of applications being publicly notified and having to be 
formally decided following a full hearing of the Council's Town 
Planning Committee. It may have boosted the newspapers 
advertising revenue but a quick survey shows the effect on the 
increase in hearings before the local authorities: -
Wellington City Council - 300% increase; 
Lower Hutt City Council - 300% increase; 
Porirua City Council - 10% increase - revised Ordinances 
effective December 1984; 
Upper Hutt City Council - suspended applications -
revised Ordinances effective December 1984; 
Eastbourne Borough Council - 30-40% increase; 
Tawa Borough Council - minor dispensations continuing, 
major ones being treated as specified departures. 
History of Donald Design Decision 
Wellington City Council Decision - Donald Design Limited applied 
for a building permit to erect a 5 storey apartment block above a 
ground floor parking area on Oriental Parade. At the time of 
the application the Wellington City Council height requirements 
under the operative District Scheme were 30 metres and the 
application complied with this limit. Two days after the 
application was lodged the decision on the objections to the 
District Scheme Review were released pursuant to which the 
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height level was reduced from 34 metres to 16 metres. No 
appeals were lodged and the Wellington City Council treated the 
application as an application under Section 76 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977 for a dispensation from the height 
ordinance. 
Written consents from the adjoining owners were not forthcoming 
and hence the application was notified. A number of objections 
were lodged. Following a hearing the Wellington City Council 
granted the dispensation sought limiting the building to 24. 3 
metres in height. An appeal was subsequently lodged with the 
Planning Tribunal. 
Planning Tribunal Decision - The Planning Tribunal looked to see 
whether the Wellington City Council had the power to grant a 
dispensation or waiver. In determining this issue it is irrelevant 
that in this instance the dispensation sought was a major one 
increasing the building's height by some 50%. The Planning 
Tribunal actually conceded that Wellington City is of such 
topography that the flexibility of the dispensation procedures are 
particularly appropriate to deal with particular sites that may 
have special physical attributes that take them outside the 
general provisions of a particular zone. 
The Planning Tribunal examined the Wellington City Council 
District Scheme Review to ascertain whether the Wellington City 
Council had complied with the requirements of Section 36 (6) of 
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the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The Tribunal noted 
that Section 36 calls for the Council to provide for the 
circumstances under which, the manner in which, and the 
conditions subject to which, the Council may grant dispensations 
or waivers. The particular ordinance in the Wellington City 
Council District Scheme Review simply stated: -
"2 . 4 Dispensations and Waivers 
2. 4 .1.1 Whether or not any ordinance expressly provides 
for Council to dispense with any provision of the 
Scheme, the Council may grant an application for 
the dispensation wholly or partly from, or waiver 
of, any provision of the District Scheme relating 
to: 
1 the subdivision of land permitted to be used for 
any urban purpose; 
2 the height, bulk and location of buildings 
permitted on site; 
3 the provision of parking and loading spaces; 
4 the design and appearance of buildings and signs 
and the provision, design and appearance of 
verandahs; 
5 landscaping; and 
6 such other matters as may be specified in that 
behalf by any regulations in force under the Act". 
- 71 -
The above ordinance as will be realised is simply a verbatim 
recital of the provisions of Section 36 ( 6) of the Act. 
The Tribunal noted that the Wellington City Council was not 
alone in this practice and ventured to say many of the District 
Schemes in New Zealand failed to follow the direction of Section 
36(6). The Tribunal viewed this as defeating the purpose of 
such a power as it didn't enable the public who may be offended 
by such a dispensation to ascertain with any degree of precision 
the circumstances which may justify the granting of such a 
dispensation. 
The Tribunal believed its approach as to the correct 
interpretation of Section 36(6) was reinforced by the opening 
words of Section 76(1) " ..... to the extent that it is provided for 
in the District Scheme pursuant to Section 36(3) of this Act". 
The Tribunal conceded this when looking firstly to see if the 
Wellington City Council had the power to grant the dispensation 
sought and clearly hinted that in failing to follow the directions 
of Section 36(6) that it didn't have such a power. The Tribunal 
accordingly disallowed the dispensation granted on its merits as 
it did not have any specific legal jurisdiction to declare the 
ordinance invalid. It did, however, invite a case to be stated to 
the High Court on the issue. 
It is interesting in the Tribunal's decision to note that it 
conceded that matters of principle may be difficult to enunciate 
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but they should be topographical rather than relate to the 
intensification of use. Thus they should not be general in 
nature but designed to cater for the special needs and 
requirements of a certain area or situation. 
The matter proceeded to the High Court by way of a case stated 
and hence the High Court was called upon to examine the 
adequacy of the Wellington City Council ordinance. The Chief 
Justice followed very closely the approach of the Planning 
Tribunal in deciding that the Wellington City Council Ordinance 
2. 5 was invalid for its failure to comply with the requirements of 
Section 36 ( 6). Attention was focused again on the wording 
Section 76 ( 1) which enables a dispensation to be granted "to the 
extent" provided for pursuant to Section 36(6). The Court held 
that this meant the District Scheme should set out the spatial or 
quantitative limits of the dispensation beyond which a 
dispensation should not be granted. The Chief Justice again 
stressed that the main purpose of this was to enable nearby 
residents and members of the public to know where they stood. 
An historical analysis of the dispensation and waiver powers was 
undertaken along with a brief survey of decided cases. This 
only reinforced the Court's view that the Wellington City Council 
ordinance failed to set out adequately the circumstances, manner 
and considerations as required by Section 36(6). As a result of 
this decision many questions have no doubt now been raised in 
the minds of various officials of local authorities. 
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5 .12 (\re the Existing Dispensations Valid? 
That was a question raised by Dr K. A. Palmer in an article 
contained in Volume 75 of the Planning Quarterly published not 
long after the decision was made known. It was his view that 
the Councils need not greatly concern themselves in this respect 
as a result of a ruling given by the Court of Appeal in A. J. 
Burr v Blenheim Borough Council [ 1980] 2 N. Z. L. R. 1. This 
decision held that a purported conditional use planning consent 
granted under a scheme prior to it becoming operative, was not 
invalid as a matter of substantive law, as the application 
procedures followed in fact were substantially fair and similar to 
the correct procedures, and the planning consent was confirmed. 
Given that the High Court has ruled that the Wellington 
ordinances are invalid and cannot be used for the granting of 
future dispensations the question then is "are the Courts prior 
to the completion of any revised ordinances likely to follow a 
procedure that is substantially different from the one pursuant 
to which the existing dispensations and waivers were granted". 
The case of Otumoetai Baptist Church v Tauranga City Council 
(which will be noted at greater length shortly) indicates that the 
approach to be adopted will not be substantially different and 
hence it could not be said that those procedures previously 
adopted were substantially unfair or incorrect. Accordingly it is 
difficult to see any existing dispensation granted could be held 
invalid, notwithstanding any inadequacies in the scheme 
ordinances. This was the view of Dr Palmer even before he was 
aware of the outcome of the Otumoetai Baptist Church case which 
only enforces the validity of that conclusion. 
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5 .13 _Could a Council be Liable for Negligence 
In continuing to grant dispensations if a Local Authority had a 
dispensation or waiver ordinance similar to the one contained in 
the Wellington District Scheme which only repeated verbatim the 
provisions of Section 36 then that Authority would be most 
unwise to continue to grant dispensations and waivers. If it did 
so for a short time due to the fact that it was not aware of the 
High Court ruling then it is quite probable that a claim in 
negligence could not succeed. Authority for this proposition is 
Port Underwood Forests Limited v Marlborough County 
Council [ 1982] 1 N. Z. L. R. 343. That case suggests that a 
Council cannot be held to be liable in negligence for 
inadvertently failing to observe planning procedures. It does 
however suggest that if the Council deliberately failed to observe 
planning procedures then a claim in negligence could succeed. 
The Donald Design decision, however, has been well publicised 
in the mass media and the more specialist journals and there 
would be little doubt that most local authorities knew of the 
impact of the same very shortly after its release. 
5 .14 The Remedy 
The effect of the decision has, as we have seen, been quite 
catastrophic on the work load of many Local Authority town 
planning sections and committees especially the larger ones. 
Most have considered that they no longer have the power to 
grant any dispensations or waivers without firstly revising their 
code of ordinances to add the necessary detail and information 
required to comply with Section 36(6) of the Act. In the 
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December 1984 issue of "People & Planning" it was recorded at 
that time that 16 Local Authorities had initiated changes to their 
District Schemes to take into account the High Court decision. 
It is recorded that the new provisions show varying 
interpretations as to the way in which one must satisfy the ratio 
of the High Court judgment which has been basically held to be 
that District Schemes should state clearly the conditions under 
which, and the extent to which, dispensations and waivers 
should be granted. Most apparently include a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative criteria. 
Some would suggest that the only real solution rests with 
remedial legislation. Apparently at least one local authority with 
the support of others is pursuing amending legislation. This, 
however, is not a view held by Dr Palmer who believes that the 
Donald Design decision ought to be met in a positive way by 
Councils and planning officers alike and that any District Scheme 
with inadequate dispensation provisions should be amended by 
way of a scheme change as soon as adequate guidelines can be 
formulated. Dr Palmer has in fact considered ways in which 
each of the five matters set out in Section 36(6) (a) to (e) could 
be dealt with. A brief summary of these are: -
(a) Subdivision of land permitted to be used for any urban 
purpose - He proposes the scheme could limit the extent 
of a possible dispensation to, say, 25% as regards the 
reduction in minimum lot size. The scheme would also 
(b) 
Cc) 
(d) 
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identify which zones this power applies to ie. those used 
for any urban purpose. 
The height, bulk and location of buildings permitted on 
site - In respect of the height dispensations different 
maximum percentage increases could be established for 
different areas. This could similarly be done in respect 
of bulk or site coverage dispensations. He recommends 
that in some situations guidance be given as regards set 
offs ie. a dispensation in respect of outdoor living spaces 
being replaced by balconies or roof gardens. 
The provision of parking and loading spaces - He 
suggests that the Council may well distinguish between 
residential areas and commercial or industrial areas with 
dispensations being granted more freely in respect of the 
former except perhaps where the vehicles movements from 
a site are uncharacteristically low or parking demands for 
different uses occur at different times etc. 
The design and appearance of buildings and signs and 
the provision, design and appearance of verandahs - He 
suggests the scheme could provide for a dispensation 
where insistence upon the design of a verandah would not 
achieve the harmony and amenity objectives of the 
ordinance, or would involve a minor inconsequential 
variation. As regards signs, he suggests the setting of 
guidelines as to maximum percentage increases e.g. 20% 
(e) 
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where justified by particular circumstances. 
Landscaping - The scheme could indicate that one could 
reduce the required landscaped area in a particular zone 
by a fixed percentage where the ground conditions or 
nature of the site or building justified such a reduction. 
Similarly the scheme could make provision for offsetting 
procedures, ie. the landscaping obligation for a particular 
yard could be dispensed with if it was transferred to an 
alternative part of the site. 
Whether one should have to provide this detail in District Scheme 
ordinances very much calls into question the vexed debate as to 
the need for certainty to enable every owner and prospective 
owner to know where they stand as opposed to the need for 
flexibility to avoid any unnecessary restrictions upon the 
utilisation of land which will have no detrimental effect to the 
planning objectives of the area. The answer to that issue has 
never been easy to determine and as times and attitudes change, 
greater and lesser emphasis are respectively placed on both 
flexibility and certainty. One certainty that has arisen since the 
Donald Design decision is that it does appear that commonsense 
is likely to prevail and, apart from increasing the work load of 
Local Authorities town planning committees, the net effect of the 
decision in terms of the actual outcome of the various 
applications is not likely to be particular great. It appears now 
that Local Authorities and the Tribunal are likely to make 
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subsequent decisions in accordance with the spirit and intent of 
the dispensation provisions although not being able, at this time 
in many instances, to reJy purely on Section 76 of the Act. The 
first reported case to be decided since the Donald Design 
decision was that of Otumoetai Baptist Church v Tauranga City 
Council [19851 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 321. The Church wished to erect 
a new and larger auditorium on a large site in Tauranga which 
was zoned residential. It required dispensations from side yard, 
height and daylighting requirements. Application was made in 
December 1983 and the consent of the main neighbour was not 
forthcoming. The Council granted the height dispensation but 
said the other two matters must be the subject of a notified 
application. The Council heard the notified application, the main 
neighbour objecting, and refused consent under Section 76 of 
the Act. An appeal by the Church followed and was heard by 
the Tribunal after the height High Court decision in the Donald 
Design case. It was conceded that in light of that decision the 
ordinance in the Tauranga District Scheme must be considered 
invalid and the Church required consent under Section 7 4 of the 
Act. 
The side yard and daylighting provisions were the two issues 
principally considered. The Tribunal noted that whilst the 
daylighting control provision existed principally for the benefit 
of neighbouring properties, the side yard requirements had a 
general objective. They had to be considered from three 
perspectives (1) those who occupy the subject site, (2) the 
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neighbours and the effect the buildings will have on them, ( 3) 
the general public in their perception of the building in 
relationship to neighbouring buildings. 
The Tribunal stated that the provisions in the District Scheme as 
to the height, bulk and location of buildings for a neighbourhood 
is fixed in a somewhat arbitrary manner on a broad brush basis 
and hence the need for exception or exemption provisions to deal 
with particular sites and their individual needs. Then the 
Tribunal went on to confirm that dispensations and waivers are 
merely a category of exceptions to, or departures from the 
provisions of a District Scheme. Up to this point in the decision 
there is nothing particularly unexpected. But at this point the 
Tribunal stated: -
"Irrespective of whether consent to a dispensation or 
waiver can be given pursuant to a provision in the 
District Scheme, or whether consent (if it is to be given) 
can only be under Section 7 4, the appropriate questions 
to be asked are those contained in Section 76(2) viz: 
Whether the dispensation or waiver would encourage 
better development of the site; and 
Whether it would be unreasonable or impracticable to 
enforce the provision in respect of the site". 
In this case the Tribunal held the non-compliance of the side 
yard requirements would not allow better development of the site 
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from the viewpoint of either the neighbour or the general public 
at large. The latter consideration seemed to be the predominant 
one. 
It is the Tribunal's approach to considering what is basically a 
dispensation or waiver matter under Section 7 4 which is of most 
interest. This has been since confirmed correct by the High 
Court. 70A It seems that the difference between determining 
such matters under Section 7 4 and Section 76 is not great. The 
Tribunal at least in this case looked firstly at Section 76 and the 
suggestion is that if those requirements can be met it is likely 
consent will be given under Section 7 4. 
The second case was the decision in Golding & Walker Motors 
Limited v Stratford Borough (unreported). This related to a 
provision in the Stratford Borough District Scheme which 
required that buildings in the heart of the commercial district 
provide a verandah along the street frontage. The ordinance 
provided that "the verandah provisions may be dispensed with 
where the building is set back to the approval of the Council". 
Although the Tribunal was not called upon to rule as to the 
validity of the dispensation provision in the light of the Donald 
Design case, it expressed the view that it was still valid 
"because it prescribes the manner in which and the 
circumstances in which the ordinance provision may be dispensed 
with". 
5 .15 Conclusion 
The decision in Golding & Walker Motors Limited suggests that 
those Local Authorities setting about the enormous task of 
70A Nicholson v Waimari County Council (1985) 10 N.Z.T.P.A. 375 
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inserting into their Code of Ordinances lengthy conditions and 
provisions pursuant to which dispensations and waivers may be 
granted could be doing so unnecessarily. It does seem that the 
insertion of brief criteria may not only satisfy the requirements 
of Sections 36 and 76 as interpreted by the High Court but in 
doing so provide an appropriate balance between certainty and 
flexibility. 
5 .16 Survey Results 
At least two recipients noted that much depended on how long 
the operative District Scheme had been in force and commented 
that a one year spot survey didn't provide very accurate 
results. 
The survey did however produce some crys of protest from Local 
Authorities resulting from the Donald Design decisions. The 
Howick Borough Council recorded a fourfold increase in its 
notified applications as a result of that decision. Many however 
confirmed that a Scheme change had or was being promulgated. 
Most indicted that they believed there was still scope for 
adopting r1ore informal procedures to deal with minor 
dispensations. One or two noted that some dispensations may 
involve what are considered at times to be minor matters but 
because of the degree of non compliance are really significant 
departures and should be treated accordingly. Quite a number 
of recipients voluntarily indicated how their Local Authorities 
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utilised their powers of delegation to deal with minor 
applications. The system seems to vary from small committees to 
giving the responsibility to the Town Planner. 
A significant number of Local Authorities reported an increase in 
their work load in the planning area. This was not all due to 
the Donald Design decision. Some expressed concern at the 
strain this placed on their financial and administrative resources. 
Comments in this regard were often expressed along with a 
desire for greater flexibility. It would seem that a significant 
number of Local Authorities which to simplify the planning 
procedure for minor dispensation application. Whilst few would 
contest that proposition the $64, OOO question is however when 
dealing with the non obvious examples, what is a minor 
application or dispensation? 
6 EXISTING USE RIGHTS 
6 .1 General 
As a general rule one must observe the provisions of Local 
Authority District Schemes. The relevant Town Planning 
Statutes have over the years made special provision covering 
those uses of land or buildings which do not conform with the 
current provisions of the District Scheme, but which had 
previously conformed with the provisions or had not been 
contrary to the provisions due to the fact that there was no 
71. 
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scheme. For this reason there has always been special 
provisions covering situations that have been held to be 
governed by what is known as existing use rights. It stands to 
reason for commercial purposes if one is to have a fluid town 
planning scheme that is able to change with the times and the 
needs of society and the community there must be some 
protection for those who in the past lawfully carried out an 
activity and then, following the implementation of a District 
Scheme or a District scheme Review, find that their particular 
activity is non-conforming. Provided such activities are 
continued (i.e. not discontinued for six months or more) then 
the protection remains and runs with the land or building. The 
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 does not provide for a 
phased removal of such non-conforming uses or in any way limits 
them in duration. The only definitive absolute action which the 
Local Authority can take to bring the use of the land or building 
into conformity with the provisions of the District Scheme is to 
acquire the land pursuant to Section 81 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977 which provides in sub-section l(c) 
that the Council can acquire the land for: -
"the purpose of terminating any use of any land or 
building that does not conform to the scheme". 
The above course of action is somewhat drastic and it is not in 
the intersets of good planning to entrench non-conforming uses. 
It would also delay the day when the objects of the scheme will 
be achieved. 71 There are fairly strict requirements and limits 
Canterbury Re ·onal Plannin 
L1m1ted v Riccarton Borough 
6.2 
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imposed by statute as regards existing uses. It has been said 
by the Planning Tribunal as regards existing uses that: -
"Whilst existing uses may continue, they may not expand 
to the extent that is beyond the ambit of Section 90. 
The impetus of the Act is to protect the persons who 
have existing land uses, but to prevent those uses, 
within certain limits, from becoming destructive to 
cohesive development which is one of the objective8 of the 
District Scheme". 
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It has now pertinent to consider the present statutory provision 
relating to existing use rights which is Section 90 of the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1977 as amended by Section 23 of the 
Town and Country Planning Amendment Act 1980. 
Present Section 90 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
The present Section 90 reads: -
"90. Existing use may continue - (1) any land or 
building may be used in a manner that is not in 
conformity with the District Scheme or any part or 
provision of it as in force for the time being if -
( a) The use of that land or building -
(i) was lawfully established before the 
District Scheme or the relevant part 
72. Waitaki New Zealand Refrigerating v Waimea County (1980) 7 
N.Z.T.P.A. 339, 341 
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or provision of it became operative; 
and 
(ii) is of the same character, intensity, 
and scale as, or of a similar 
character, intensity, and scale to, 
that for which it was last lawfully 
used before the date on which the 
District Scheme or the relevant part 
or provision of it became operative; 
or 
(b) In the case of a new building, whether 
proposed, partly erected, or erected, which 
has not been used before the date on which 
the District Scheme or the relevant part or 
provision of it became operative, the use is 
for any purpose for which approval for its 
erection was given by the Council; but any 
use of such new building which commenced 
after the expiry of a period of 2 years 
after the date on which the Council 
consented to the erection of the building 
shall not be lawful unless -
(i) the Council certifies that substantial 
progress has been made within the 2 
year period towards the erection or 
completion of the building; and 
(ii) the building has been used for the 
purpose for which it was to be 
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erected or for any purpose that is of the 
same or a similar character, intensity, and 
scale since the erection or completion of the 
building; or 
(c) The use is pursuant to an application 
granted under this Act or the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1953 either before or 
after the date on which the District Scheme 
or relevant part or provision of it became 
operative. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of 
this section, if at any time after the date on which 
the District Scheme or the relevant part or 
provision of it became operative the use of any 
land or building authorised under subsection (1) 
of this section is discontinued for a period of 6 
months, no use of that land or building shall at 
any subsequent time be regarded as permitted by 
this section unless the Council, on application 
made to it within 12 months after the use first 
being discontinued, consents to that period of 6 
months being extended to a period coinciding with 
the period during which the use was 
discontinued". 
6. 3 Prior to 1980 Amendment 
Prior to the 1980 Amendment, Section 90 of the Town and 
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Country Planning Act 1977 linked Section 90(1)(a)(i) and Section 
90 ( 1 )( a)(ii) with the disjunctive word "or" rather than the 
conjunctive word "and". The Bill's explanatory note states that 
the amendment was made to correct a drafting error. A learned 
writer on this issue, Mr Keith Berman, believes the amendment 
itself is a drafting error and the section in its original form was 
far more satisfactory. 
The Number One Division of the Planning Tribunal interpreted 
Section 90 as it read in 1977 very simply i.e. that existing uses 
existed when two sets of circumstances existed. This was neatly 
put by the Number One Division headed by Judge Skelton in the 
case of The New Zealand Farmer's Fertiliser Company Limited 
[1980] 7 N.Z.T.P.A. 315 where it was said "having regard to 
the disjunctive provisions of Section 90(1)(a), we take the view 
and so hold that the legislature intended to provide for two sets 
of circumstances, the first being those where the use of the land 
and/ or building remains the same use and secondly, those where 
the use, whilst changing, remains for the same or similar 
character, intensity and scale". However, the Number Two 
Division of the Tribunal headed by Judge Treadwell did not hold 
that the section should be interpreted so precisely in the case of 
Waitaki New Zealand Refrigerating Limited v Waimea County 
Council [ 1980] 7 N. Z. T. P.A. 339 the different interpretations 
are discussed in an article by ~1r Berman. 
73 
The interpretation 
of the Number Two Division of the Tribunal in the Waitaki case 
73. Whats the Use 9182 N.Z.L.J. 17 
74. 
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of the disjunctive wording of Section 90 as it applied prior to 
the 1980 amendment was to consider whether there was a change 
in the character of the use without firstly determining whether 
the present use differed from the earlier one. It must be 
conceded that the Number Two Tribunal blurred the precise 
disjunctive approach in using the tests of character, intensity 
and scale as contained in Section 90(1)(a)(ii) to deal with the 
question posed in Section 90(1)(a)(i). The comments of Mr 
Berman however I submit may be somewhat harsh. 
When examining the situation prior to that amendment various 
decisions have confirmed the interpretation given to the 
disjunctive word "or" by the Number One Tribunal with the most 
positive affirmation not surprisingly being made when Judge 
Skelton was sitting alone.
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It is not purely of historical 
interest to examine how the Tribunal interpreted the section 
prior to the 1980 amendment as the decisions made since the 1980 
amendment have indicated that despite the amendment they arc 
going to interpret the section as it presently stands to provide 
for a fair and equitable result even if it is necessary to stretch 
the meaning of some of the words of the English language. 
Whilst Mr Berman called for legislative reform to enable fair 
results to be achieved, the Tribunal have considered that they 
can reach these conclusions despite what would appear to be the 
narrower ambit of the section following the 1980 amendment. 
The question to be asked is whether or not the Tribunal has 
really been entitled to reach the decisions that it has following 
Re an application by Roald Bank [1983] 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 6 
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the 1980 amendment if it took full cognaisance of the actual 
wording of the section. 
6. 4 1980 Amendment 
There can be no doubt no matter what interpretation was placed 
on the former Section 90 that the 1980 amendment in substituting 
the word "and" for "or" has literally speaking tightened up the 
provisions. 
Mr Berman suggested that the form of provision was more 
sensible when he stated: -
"Previously the use could either be the same use as earlier 
established or a different use of the same character etc. 
There was good sense in that approach because, so long 
as the impact of the use on its neighbours did not 
change, it mattered not whether the use was the same, or 
different, but of the same character etc". 
On reading literally the wording of the section following the 1980 
amendment, it should follow that a different use is totally 
prohibited because it cannot satisfy the first leg of Section 
90(1)(a) whereas previously one could have had a different use 
provided it was of the same character, intensity and scale. Mr 
Berman's fear was that Section 90 as amended no longer allowed 
one to alter the use from one non-conforming use to another an 
inocuious non-conforming use e.g. a change from a baker's shop 
to a cake shop. It clearly has made the determination of the 
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"use" a paramount consideration. Where as the terms 
"character" and "amenities" are defined in the Act the term use 
is not so defined. Where our courts have been called on to 
determine what deviation from lawfully established uses are 
permissible New Zealand courts have in the main as cited by Mr 
Berman shown a willingness to take a generous view of these 
categories. It is now pertinent to consider how the Planning 
Tribunal has handed the problem since the 1980 amendments. 
6. 5 Post 1980 Amendment Cases 
75. 
First leading decision following the 1980 amendment was Huljich v 
Mount Wellington Borough (1981) 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 53:-
The applicant sought a declaration that a small proposed addition 
to part of his wholesaler's butcher's premises would have the 
benefit of existing use rights that pertained to the rest of the 
premises. The Tribunal read Section 90 in conjunction with 
Section 91 of the Act to interpret that the word "building" 
encompassed the proposed addition as permitted by Section 91. 
That being the case, the use was clearly the same and 
consideration was required pursuant to Section 90(1) (a) (ii). 
The case is interesting and noted because the Tribunal 
determined that in assessing the "intensity and scale" of the use 
one regards the affects of the use upon the amenities of the 
neighbourhood. 
This is an interesting approach and has been followed in 
d 
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subsequent ec1s1ons. Whilst perhaps somewhat irrelevant, it 
is interesting to note that whilst small additions to existing 
Dawson v Marton Borough Council [1981] 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 190 
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buildings have been held to satisfy Section 90 and 91 provided 
the criteria regarding character, intensity and scale are met, the 
same cannot be said for an addition of a large separate 
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structure. 
The next case was : -
Dawson v Marton Borough Council [1981] 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 290. 
This case concerned a small builder's workshop and depot owned 
by the Calkin Brothers. From 1963 to 1980 the premises were 
used for these purposes until 1980 when two separate parts were 
sub-let to an electrical contractor and a cabinet maker. 
Although the superseded District Scheme would have permitted 
all these uses, the Tribunal held that in considering the 
particular uses, reference to the provisions of the previous 
schemes were irrelevant. The Tribunal followed the approach 
adopted in the Huljich case and this time determined the 
"character" of the use had changed after examining the intensity 
and scale of the new activities from the viewpoint as to how they 
affected the amenities of the neighbourhood. 
In this case, the Tribunal is clearly emphasising that existing 
use rights are not to be viewed in a vacuum or too literally, but 
76. Wilson v Wanganui City Council [1982] 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 398 
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with regard to the practical affects the change will have on the 
amenities of the neighbourhood. The fact of the Tribunal held 
the "character" of the use had not changed in the ordinary 
sense, but had changed as regards the affect of the amenities of 
the neighbourhood reveals the willingness of the Tribunal to use 
semantics to adhere to the spirit of the Act rather than be 
confined by the precise wording of the legislation. 
The next case was:-
Griffiths v Auckland City Council (1981] 8 N.Z.T.P.A. 290. 
In this case, the Tribunal tackled the fear expressed by Mr 
Berman head-on. 
The land was originally used as a wood and coal yard, for the 
storage of cement and other builders' materials and as a cartage 
depot. It was then used for servicing motor vehicles and for a 
period by a towing company. The issue was whether the 
existing use right covered by the proposed operations relating to 
the hire of domestic, party and catering equipment involving the 
parking, loading and unloading of vehicles. 
The Tribunal held: -
"It is not necessary for the actual use to remain precisely 
the same as that which existed when the District Scheme 
or relevant provision became operative. The actual use 
can change provided the use made of the property is of 
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the same character, intensity and scale as (or of a similar 
character, intensity and scale to) that for which it was 
being lawfully used at the time the District Scheme (or 
relevant provision) became operative. And in that 
context, the term "character" has to be construed with 
regard to the effect of the use upon the amenities of the 
neighbourhood - see Section 2(2)". 
The real bottom line of this decision was contained in the 
statement: -
"Although Section 90 speaks of a use which is of the same 
or a similar character as that of its predecessor we have 
interpreted that as including a use which is less 
detrimental to the amenities of the neighbourhood than its 
predecessor was". 
Now Mr Berman's worst fears have been allayed, but is the 
situation really any clearer? The interpretation of the section as 
contained in the previous statement may be a fair interpretation, 
but it does, I suggest, blur any clear interpretation of the 
conjunctive approach and indicate that perhaps things haven't 
changed very much at all with the 1980 amendment as this 
interpretation is akin to the approach followed by the Tribunal 
in the Waitaki case. 
The next case illustrating how difficult Section 90 is an is likely 
to remain was: -
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Tau po Borough Council v Williams [ 1981] 8 N. z. T. p. A. 348. 
The Tribunal considered the use of Rotonui Lodg·e, a six 
bedroom boarding house in Taupo used extensively by truck 
drivers. The Tribunal examined two Australian decisions when 
considering the meaning of the word "use" and held the word 
use as it applies to the use of Rotonui Lodge is limited to the 
activities which are under the management and control of the 
proprietors or managers of the premises. 
Although it was conceded there are more heavy trucks visiting 
Rotonui Lodge who park in or around Rotonui Lodge because the 
management can't control how their guests arrive at Rotonui 
Lodge there was no change in the character, intensity and scale 
of Rotonui Lodge, as it was still being used as a boarding 
house. This was the ruling despite the fact that the amenities 
of the neighbourhood were clearly affected. 
Whilst one can understand the fine distinction being made as 
regards the definition of "the use" of Rotonui Lodge, it does 
seem to be a strict interpretation that contrasts with the more 
flexible approach offered in the Griffith's case to achieve a more 
equitable result. The only consolation offer here is that it is 
suggested that the parking of heavy trucks on Rotonui Lodge 
property with the adherent manoeuvrings may constitute an 
"objectionable element" and hence be actionable under Section 77 
of the Act. 
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Re an application by Roald Bank [1982] 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 6. 
This decision examines the history of the amendment and the 
article of Mr Berman. The Tribunal here simply follows the lead 
given in the decision of Griffiths v Auckland City Council. This 
was another case where the manufacturing activities changed 
quite radically from manufacture of garage doors and ladders to 
that of leather goods. The effects on the amenities of the 
neighbourhood were considerably lessened. The Tribunal held 
following the Griffiths decision that one should interpret Section 
90 broadly whilst expressly rejecting the narrow interpretation 
postulated by Mr Berman. In conclusion it was stated: -
"In the case of a statute dealing with land use planning 
where a consideration of the effects on the amenities of a 
neighbourhood is a integral part of the scheme of the 
statute, I cannot bring myself to give this decision a 
narrow interpretation. I have concluded that I should 
follow Griffiths v Auckland City Council (supra) which 
seems, to me, to accord with the spirit of the statute". 
The Tribunal once again showed its flexibility when it 
distinguished the Roald Bank and Griffiths decision in the case 
of:-
Re an application by Riccarton Borough Council [1983] 9 
N. z. T. p. A. 66. This was an application to erect a lean to onto 
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the side of a small neighbourhood residence/ shop to accommodate 
space invader machines. This decision is interesting on three 
counts:-
1 . The solicitor for the Riccarton Borough Council urged the 
Tribunal to adopt what is reported as a narrower 
interpretation of Section 90(1) (a) as taken in the Waitaki 
case. This ignores the 1980 amendment, although there 
is no comment on this fact in the decision. It highlights 
the confusion that still exists as regards this section. 
2. The Tribunal distinguished the cases of Roald Bank v 
Christchurch City and Griffiths v Auckland City 
Council on the basis that this was not a case where an 
established protected use was being replaced by a 
different use of the same or similar intensity and scale. 
In interpreting those decisions so precisely in that way, 
the Tribunal has really said that we are back to the 
former disjunctive situation whereby the use can be quite 
different, but one still goes on to examine the second 
part of Section 90(1)(a) namely sub-paragraph (ii). In 
those cases, the difference in use was not great and the 
decisions made sense when reviewed in context. In this 
instance, the Tribunal has stated the principle of those 
decisions is that where the protected use is replaced by a 
different use then one goes on to examine the character, 
intensity and scale of the different use. 
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3. Not surprisingly, the Tribunal has held that when one 
introduces amusement devices to a neighbourhood 
residence/ shop, the character, intensity and scale of the 
use alters materially and thus the Tribunal declined the 
application. 
The next case to follow was:-
Graham v Christchurch City [1983] 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 449. 
The facts are not relevant. The Tribunal here reviewed the 
series of decisions following the 1980 amendment that adopted the 
liberal approach of Section 90 from Griffiths to Roald Bank to an 
unreported decisions of Smith - Hall v Te Awamutu Borough 
Council W /83 given on 3rd June 1983. This line of authority was 
compared with Mr Berman's view supporting the narrow 
interpretation of Section 90. The solicitor for the Christchurch 
City Council seeking the narrower interpretation conceded that 
whilst the liberal interpretation made sense and would lead to 
greater justice in the majority of cases, it was not open to the 
Tribunal to interpret the legislation in that way because of the 
literal wording simply to promote the expedient or most just 
result. 
The solicitor of the Christchurch City Council noted the words 
"The use" at the beginning of Section 90(1)(a), which introduces 
sub-paragraphs (1) and (ii). He submitted that "the use" must 
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refer to the same use, namely the use that was formerly 
established prior to the new District Scheme or relevant 
provision becoming operative. 
The Tribunal rejected this interpretation and stated: -
"It is evident that the words "The use of the land or 
building" in the introductory part of paragraph "a" are to 
be read as the opening words of both sub-paragraph (i) 
and (ii). When they are read as introducing 
sub-paragraph (i), they clearly refer to a past situation, 
one which existed before the District Scheme became 
operative. However, when they are read as opening (ii) 
they cannot refer to the same past situation, because that 
sub-paragraph calls for a comparison to be made with that 
past situation. To make sense of that sub-paragraph, 
the opening words must be read as referring to the use 
which is the subject of the consideration of whether it 
qualifies as an existing use authorised by Section 90 of 
the Act, being a use which, in terms of the introductory 
part of sub-section ( 1) , is 'not in conformity with the 
District Scheme"'. 
The Tribunal concludes that on the above basis the use may be 
the same as that which existed at the specified time in the past 
or may be different. It is however necessary for the present or 
proposed use to be of the same character, intensity and scale as 
the past use. 
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The writer's view is that the interpretation of the Tribunal is 
contrived and wrong. The writer believes that the solicitor for 
the Christchurch City Council was wrong in his submission that 
"The use ... " at the commencement of paragraph (a) referred to 
the same use as that which was formerly established. The 
Tribunal willingly adopted this interpretation to come to its 
logical but with respect incorrect conclusion. The writer 
believes that the words "The use ... " at the beginning of 
paragraph (a) refers to the present or proposed use. This 
would be consistent with the proceeding words that commence 
Section 90 ("any land or buildings may be used ... "). 
This would mean that the purpose of Section 90(1)(a)(ii) would 
be to regulate or control variations in the character, intensity 
and scale of uses lawfully established prior to any District 
Scheme or part thereof becoming operative, so as to make such 
uses non-conforming. It would not allow such uses to change 
even if the effects of the new use were to be less detrimental to 
the amenities of the neighbourhood. Whilst this view may seem 
rigid and produce harsh results, it is, I believe, more consistent 
with what the legislation actually states. 
The next case that followed the Griffith's approach indicated how 
dangerous it can become when one has to consider the 
consequences of a contrived interpretation. It was the decision 
of:-
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Papatoetoe City Council v I. H. Wedding & Sons Limited ( 1983] 9 
N. Z. T. P.A. 430. 
The premises in question were used initially as an agricultural 
contracting depot, then by a carrier for the parking and 
maintenance of trucks for seven years. When the Scheme became 
operative the premises were being used as a general contractors; 
yard, depot and workshop. The Tribunal held here: -
"It is not necessary for the actual use of the property to 
remain the same for "existing use" rights to continue". 
The Tribunal found that a non-conforming use of one kind or 
another had to be conducted on the property for all the relevant 
period and accordingly in this situation Section 90(2) did not 
apply as regards the period of discontinuance of six months. 
The Tribunal held the words "the use of the land or building" in 
Section 90(2) referred to any nonconforming use. The 
interpretation is consistent with the view that the use can be 
different, but still satisfy Section 90(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
The Tribunal here in fact held that the activities of a 
contractors' workshop and yard were, when considered in their 
totality, the same as activities associated with the maintenance 
and repair on site of vehicles. The affect on the neighbourhood 
of these two uses were of an industrial nature and held to be 
the same. Accordingly, the Tribunal was then able to move on 
to consider Section 90(1)(a)(ii). 
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The Tribunal here in fact held that the activities of a 
contractors' workshop and yard were, when considered in their 
totality, the same as activities associated with the maintenance 
and repair on site of vehicles. The affect on the neighbourhood 
of these two uses were of an industrial nature and held to be 
the same accordingly, the Tribunal was then able to move on to 
consider Section 90(1)(a)(ii). The Tribunal in adopting a broad 
definition of the word "use" wasn't drawn into the debate as 
whether one could proceed to consider Section 90 ( 1) ( a)(ii) if the 
uses were different but perhaps the affect on the neighbourhood 
were the same or less. 
The latest decision on this issue is: -
Waimari District Council v United Bridge Club (non-smokers) 
[1983] 9 N.Z.T.P.A. 437. 
The premises were in a residential area. They were used by a 
Free Mason's Lodge for meetings. As the Lodge didn't require 
the full use of the building, a Bridge Club took over the use of 
the building for part of the time and substantially increased the 
day and evening functions held on the premises. The only 
apparent evidence of increased usage was seen through the 
movement of people in cars to and from the premises. 
The interesting point raised is whether the use of the premises 
by the Lodge for meetings was the same use as that carried out 
by the Bridge Club when having card games and meetings. The 
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Tribunal properly considered the purpose of considering land 
use in Section 90 related to the determination as to whether a 
particular use was lawful and if so the use "runs with the land" 
and is not personal to the individual use. On this basis the 
Tribunal held: -
"The context of the Act calls for a broad approach as to 
the identity and definition of a use, rather than a fine 
distinction" . 
The Tribunal then, not surprisingly, held the use of the 
premises of the lodge and bridge club were part of the same 
use. 
One aspect here that the Tribunal examined the two activities in 
question from the point of view of the amenities of the 
neighbourhood and held because they were the same the uses 
were the same. The Tribunal went on to decline the application 
on the grounds of Section 90(1)(a)(ii), but the writer considers 
it doubtful under the present legislation whether in fact they 
should have been even faced with that task. 
6. 6 Conclusion 
The present wording of Section 90 (1 )( a) seems to encourage the 
contrived reasoning to achieve a fair result. The Tribunal is 
getting, I submit, entwined in an artificial reasoning process 
which may soon rebound on the Tribunal. With interpreting the 
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word "use" so broadly, one can envisage situations where the 
Tribunal will have to accept the uses are the same and also the 
character, intensity and scale are the same, although the 
activities carried on inside the building are quite different e.g. 
a get-fit club converting to a massage parlour. 
Perhaps if the effect on the amenities of the neighbourhood are 
similar, the result is desirable in a planning sense. The writer 
really wonders whether it was envisaged that the section would 
permit this type of change of activity and more importantly 
whether this type of interpretation is going to entrench existing 
uses provided they are of the same character, intensity and 
scale. One questions how long this can be allowed to continue 
before the total overall planning scheme becomes pitted. 
7 COMMENT AND SUMMARY 
The difficulty arising in respect of existing use rights and some of the 
others we have identified arise directly from the legislation that has 
been enacted to deal with a practical planning problem. It highlights 
what many people especially planners sec as being at the cause of many 
"planning problems" i.e. the interference of the law. They see less 
legislation as being the panacea for many of the present ills of 
planning. The growth in the length and complexity of the Town and 
Country Planning Acts over the years must be a course for concern, 
The present 1977 Act has 178 sections whereas in the 1953 Act there 
were 53 sections and 80 in the 1976 Act. Some Local Authority's Codes 
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of Ordinances are becoming extremely lengthy and complex containing 
many different types of uses and shades of uses. This cannot assist 
what is a basic practical task of endeavouring to improve the quality of 
life through the improvement of the physical environment, determining 
the optimal location for activities and making adequate and economic 
provision for services. 
One alternative is to follow the English system which is to deregulate 
and allow for a more ad hoe decision making process. However this has 
been dubbed "the mockery of ad hocery". This creates greater 
flexibility but in doing so one losses a degree of certainty. Some 
degree of security and certainty is felt needed by many writers and 
local planners surveyed. With greater certainty comes confidence, 
reliability and an inbuilt shield against abuses of the system. One local 
town planner in responding to the survey advocated greater flexibility 
in District Schemes whilst noting "provided they don't become lawyer's 
financial dreams and benefits". Some would say the present system is 
adequate and provides the necessary balance between certainty and 
flexibility. In a recent article Mr W. Williams the city planner for 
Christchurch stated that the present Act offers many benefits for 
planning authorities and the general public. He listed those benefits as 
being:-
" ( a) There is reasonable security and certainty: for example 
most people can have reasonable confidence that beyond 
the limits of what is permitted by the District Scheme, 
the environment they enjoy cannot be changed at least 
without rights of objection and appeal. 
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(b) There is reasonable predictability, especially when 
schemes are operative and land use patterns begin to 
stabilise. 
(c) There is little discrimination. The manual worker has the 
same rights as the wealthy businessman (although of 
course he may not have the same means to exercise them, 
but this is not the fault of the planning system). 
( d) Third party rights are well respected, perhaps more so 
than under any other system in the world. 
(e) There is little to prevent participation by individuals and 
groups in most stages of the planning process. 
( f) Our independent appeal Tribunal, free from pressure 
group and political influence is an immeasurable benefit -
we take it for granted. 
(g) Considerable flexibility does exist. 
(i) With a five yearly review. 
(ii) With a scheme change or variation. 
(iii) With specified departures. 
(iv) Conditional Uses. 
(v) With modification of conditions - Section 71. 
(vi) Applications against changes or reviews - Section ? 
(vii) Discretions - Section 36". 
It is the writer's personal view that it is essential to not only strike 
but also maintain a balance. It does seem the system is now perhaps 
overly judicial. Efforts have been made to restrict this happening e · g · 
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cross examination is excluded at Local Authority hearings - Regulation 
29(3) of the Town and Country Planning Regulations 1978. This 
however is a small concession and because all evidence is required to be 
called before the Local Authority if one is to be sure that the Tribunal 
will permit you to call all evidence on appeal it is necessary to call that 
evidence before the Local Authority unduly increasing the length and 
complexity of that hearing. The Local Authorities in some cases don't 
understand the legal principles to be applied and their decisions reflect 
this. , To a lawyer this may sound totally unacceptable but does it 
really matter given the context of the system? All parties have the 
right to appeal to the Planning Tribunal who hear the matter de novo. 
So what real harm has been done if the Local Authority applied the 
wrong section. They are determining the matter on its merits and 
ignoring the fine legal distinctions in a way one suspects a jury does 
despite receiving lengthy directions from the Judge. If one delegalised 
the Local Authority procedure then perhaps the right of appeal could 
be opened up totally so that even if one failed to object on time or 
thought it unnecessary at the Local Authority stage one could remedy 
the situation if one thought the decision was totally incorrect. This 
procedure may one suspects increase the number of appeals but 
hopefully would drastically reduce the time, expense and effort involved 
at the Local Authority level which in many cases is unlikely to go 
further or alternatively is always only going to be the first step in at 
least a two step process. 
In a paper prepared in 1983 by Miss K.A. Edmonds a Town Planner 
with the Ministry of Works she considered five options for legislative 
change which were: -
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"1 . Give councils the power to exercise total discretion i.e. 
allow them to write the rules in their District Scheme and 
define the categories of uses, procedures and criteria to 
which they will be subject and let the citizens of each 
local authority decide what is not acceptable. 
2. Extend the principle of discretionary uses to allow a local 
council to approve proposals without the present third 
party objection and appeal rights. 
3. Make more limited changes to the legislation so the 
criteria under which dispensations and waivers conditional 
uses and specified departures can be granted are more 
flexible. 
4. Return to the intention behind the changes in the 1977 
Act. 
5. Revert to the classes of use and procedures established 
in the 1953 Act". 
Her conclusion was that the practice in district planning appears to 
differ from what the legislation seemed to her to permit. The survey 
results conducted by the writer as to specified departures and 
conditional uses certainly confirms this. She advocated a change in the 
legislation and saw the best options as being a fine tuning of the 
present system which could be implemented in one of three ways which 
were:-
- 108 -
"1. Extent the principle of discretionary uses to allow a local 
council to approve proposals without the present third 
party objection and appeal rights. 
2. Make more limited changes to the legislation so the 
criteria under which dispensations and waivers, 
conditional uses and specified departures can be granted 
are more flexible. 
3. A combination of 1 and a limited 2". 
In the writer's survey the question was asked "would you prefer to see 
District Schemes provide for greater certainty or greater flexibility?" 
Some answered yes and others no which did not advance matters 
greatly. A few thought the District Scheme was satisfactory. The 
majority however advocated greater flexibility. Some indicated that 
they were moving in this direction whilst reviewing their District 
Schemes. Others made it clear they saw nothing wrong with the 
legislative framework but believed many Local Authorities were not 
utilising the potential of the legislation when drafting their District 
Schemes. It was noted that a price of greater flexibility may be 
greater costs as it would require more administrative efforts. It was 
suggested more District Schemes should follow the example of the 
Christchurch City Council and move away in part from the concept of 
defined uses and in turn legislate for performance standards that any 
use would have to met to be included within a specified zone. The loss 
of the Local Authority's dispensation powers was mourned in some 
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responses. One indicated that greater flexibility was needed for 
residential zoning but greater certainty for industrial zoning. One saw 
it desirable that the District Scheme in question provide greater 
flexibility in terms of its ordinances but greater certainty and clarity in 
terms of the aims and objectives of the Local Authority for the 
particular zones. 
As will be seen there is a wide variety of opinions. The need for 
greater flexibility is certainly highly favoured. How that is achieved is 
somewhat uncertain. The performance standard's concept is one 
continuing to find favour. Whether it will be a passing phase or a 
developing new concept only time will tell. The restless unease as to 
whether Town Planning legislation and proceedings need greater 
flexibility or certainty is an age old argument (considering the vintage 
of Town Planning). In 1977 a group of five architects headed by the 
well known Wellingtonian Ian A thfield met the Select Committee studying 
the Town and Country Planning Bill prior to the 1977 Act. They 
sought radical changes to the present system that would have resulted 
in a very flexible system based on a consensus approach. It was 
said:-
"There is a fundamental difference between the process of Town 
Planning and the process of Common Law. In Town Planning 
decisions the final result is, in most cases, a decision which will 
go far beyond the initial intention of the parties involved in the 
first instance and will effect the community as a whole and the 
people who inherit any decision. A system which establishes 
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co-operation between the parties and finally results in an 
amicable decision through initial dialogue and a 
continuation through to an ultimate conclusion, must be 
far more beneficial than the current judicial process". 
The debate is bound to continue for many a year. In conclusion a 
quote which is somewhat pessimistic: -
"The politicians 
(who are buying huge cars with hobnailed wheels the size of 
merry-go-rounds) 
have a new plan. 
They are going to put cobbles 
in our eyesockets 
and pebbles 
in our navels 
and fill us up 
with asphalt 
and lay us 
side by side 
so that we can take a more active part 
in the road 
to destruction 
Roger Mc Gough" 
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ANNEX 1 
Borough Councils - Specified Departures/Conditional Use 1984 
NB Percentage Granted 
Borough Specified Departure Conditional Use 
Matamata 100 100 
Gore 100 100 
Alexandra 100 100 
Otahuhu 100 100 
Rangiora 100 100 
Howick 100 100 
Morrinsville 90 90 
Statford 90 100 
Kaiapoi 80 100 
Greymouth 80 
80 
Mount Eden 80 
90 
Kapiti 77.8 
100 
Levin 75 
100 
Cambridge 71.4 
100 
Tawa 70 
80 
Figures unavailable from Picton and Te Aroha 
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ANNEX 2 
County and District Councils 
Specified Departure and Conditional Use Applications 1984 
NB Percentage Granted 
County or District Specified Departure Conditional Use 
Buller Bounty 100 100 
Grey County 95 100 
Rotorua District 90 100* 
Manawatu County 90 100 
Heathcote County 85 100 
Southland County 80 approx 80 approx 
Thames-Coromandel District 77 98 
Bay of Islands County 75 
95 
The Lakes, Queens town Wakatpu 45 
55 
Rangitikei County 34 
100 
Taupo County very few 
? 
*some only in part 
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ANNEX 3 
City Councils 
Specified Departure and Conditional Use Applications 1984 
NB Percentage Granted 
Cities Specified Departures Conditional Use 
Gisborne 
Nelson 
Lower Hutt 
Waitemata 
Birkenhead 
Papakura 
Papatoetoe 
Upper Hutt 
Whangarei 
Wanganui 
Timaru 
Tauranga 
Palmerston North 
Hamilton 
Hastings 
NB Porirua City Statistics unavailable 
Wellington City Council 
1984 figures unavailable 
100 
100 
98 
91 
90 
90 
88 
84.21 
82 
82 
75 
67 
66.6 
55 
33 
1981/83 Specified Departures - 70% approx 
Conditional Uses - 93% approx 
100 
100 
100 
97 
100 
80 
100 
96.77 
100 
88 
99 
83 
100 
86 
100 
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